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ANALYSIS OF U.S. MILITARY HELICOPTER 
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN 






The objective of this project was to compare the relationship between Type Model Series 
platforms maintenance capability degradation and route selections, using different 
priorities and timelines.  By identifying the top 10 maintenance failures and 
communicating these needs through the chain of command and supply chain it will 
minimize the mission capability degradation and maximize our aircraft availability.  
Establishing delivery routes that will maximize the number of sorties each aircraft can fly 
will help determine what percentage of overall demand we can meet.  As the DOD 
budget continues to decrease, we need to find a more efficient way to maximize our 
resources and reduce our costs.  The research team analyzed the impact of assigning 
aircraft by the lowest cost per flight hour in comparison to the other available T/M/S 
platforms.  This analysis also clarifies the cost benefit analysis of the ARG versus CSG 
battle groups.  By using the lessons learned from this project it will help ensure that each 
Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief  mission is delivering the right supplies by the 
right T/M/S platforms for the right price.  
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Helicopters are invaluable, especially helicopters coming in from the sea, where they can 
be refueled and resupplied out on our carriers, and are not taking up space at airfields or 
putting a logistics base at airfields. 
– Collin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, January 3, 2005. (Ellerman, 2007) 
 
In recent years, the world has seen numerous natural disasters in which the 
military has played key roles with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).  
A key component of HA/DR is to assure that relief is received is through a timely and 
efficient logistics network. 
Sea basing is a vital aspect of the U.S. military logistics abilities during relief 
efforts.  Sea basing is a naval capability that provides commanders with the ability to 
conduct selected functions and tasks at sea without reliance on infrastructure ashore 
(Dictionary.com, 2011).  The ability to launch and recover helicopters for humanitarian 
assistance from the sea, and the capacity to go virtually anywhere on land where aid is 
needed, is important for the military.  Our research team decided to draw on lessons 
learned from prior disasters to help identify the best combination of helicopters for 
supporting HA/DR missions, considering disaster requirements, aircraft and air platform 
availability and features, and critical maintenance considerations. 
Since time can be a vital factor in providing the necessary relief, it is imperative 
that the U.S. military has the most up-to-date and accurate plan available.  In order to 
create an effective plan like this the military needs to know the best combination of 
aircraft, supplies, and parts necessary to support various levels of HA/DR missions. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Natural disasters often strike without sufficient forewarning.  The U.S. military 
forces are as prepared as possible, but there is the potential of catching them off guard 
due to the unpredictable timing of natural disasters and the damage they leave behind.  
Many times these forces are engaged in their normal exercises and the U.S. government 
calls them away to aid in relief missions when necessary.    
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When the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) was asked to aid in the  relief efforts 
for the tsunami in Indonesia, Helicopter Antisubmarine Squadron 2 (HS-2) accumulated 
approximately 1,200 hours of flight time from January 15 to March 29, 2005 (Elleman, 
2007).  These hours were equivalent to the flight time in the first three months of a 
normal deployment.  These extended hours caused the squadron to incur extra 
maintenance hours to keep helicopters available.   
In such situations, not only did the squadron have to worry about unplanned 
maintenance that may occur, but planned maintenance also becomes an issue.  Before a 
squadron deploys, their operations department estimates how many hours the squadron 
will fly during the deployment; these estimations are the basis for the squadron’s 
preventative maintenance (PM) cycles.   
In recent U.S. military efforts in disaster relief, such as those in Indonesia and 
Haiti, aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships were the primary vessels using 
helicopters.  The helicopters used were primarily CH-46, CH-53, and SH-60 helicopters, 
which all have different assets to offer for disaster relief.  During the Haiti relief efforts 
from January 15 to February 1, 2010, these helicopter types flew over 1,000 hours in 
support of Haiti relief efforts, delivering approximately 500 tons of supplies into the 
country and evacuating more than 435 medical patients (LaGrone, 2010).   
Unfortunately, using helicopters in disaster relief efforts can lead to excess 
degradation or increased life-cycle cost.  Based on the lessons learned in Operations 
Unified Response (Haiti) and Unified Assistance (Indonesia), we identify in this thesis 
the optimal combination of helicopters to support a catastrophic HA/DR mission. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
Our primary objective in this project was to draw on lessons learned from prior 
disasters to help identify the best combination of helicopters for supporting HA/DR 
missions.  To achieve this objective, we considered disaster requirements, aircraft and air 
platform availability and features, and critical maintenance considerations.  We 




efforts and their assigned aircraft, and then used general statistical comparisons and cost 
per flight hour efficiency hierarchy to determine the best combination of helicopters to 
support a HA/DR mission.   
Our secondary objective in this research was to identify the top 10 maintenance 
non-mission capable supply (NMCS) failures and to analyze whether ships should carry 
excess parts for unexpected HA/DR missions that may occur during a deployment.  We 
examined the U.S. military helicopters normally used in HA/DR missions and analyzed 
the type and quantity of each part needed by the military to maintain each Type Model 
Series (T/M/S) platforms mission capability percentage.  Planning and coordination by 
squadrons, air wings, and Type Commanders (TYCOM) is essential   for a smooth 
transition to any missions that may occur. 
Our third research objective was to analyze the cost—in both time and money—of 
various helicopters used during HA/DR efforts. In this analysis, we determined the most 
efficient helicopter(s) to use for each mission based on priority demand.  Cost per hour 
(CPH) and the time necessary to deliver critical supplies or personnel are key factors in 
assigning the correct number of T/M/S platform to each priority.  We examined the 
amount of fuel and the possible number of hours flown with the various helicopters, 
determining possible cost savings when using the best helicopter for the correct mission.   
Although our main objective in this research was not to examine the correct types 
of ships the Navy should use for disaster relief efforts, we felt a need to address possible 
Battle Group options in order to help us identify the proper helicopters.  The differences 
between the makeup of squadrons in a Carrier Strike Group (CSG)  and the makeup of 
squadrons in an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) assault ship will determine which 
battle group is the most cost effective.   
C.  REASERCH QUESTIONS 
To determine how the U.S. military can best utilize one of its key logistics 
components for HA/DR efforts, we had to answer some central questions.  The following 
research questions assisted us in laying the foundation for our research: 
 1. What combination of type model series (T/M/S) platforms will best contribute 
to the effectiveness of a sea base in supporting an HA/DR mission?   
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 2. How do maintenance and repair factors affect the available flight hours per 
aircraft for a catastrophic HA/DR mission?   
 3. Which battle group type provides the best support of HA/DR missions? 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
In this research, we focused on two recent disaster relief efforts, the tsunami in 
Indonesia and the earthquake in Haiti, to analyze lessons learned using U.S. military 
helicopters in HA/DR efforts.  By focusing on the extended flight hours incurred during 
these missions, we demonstrate the difficulties a squadron experiences in preparing for 
these missions.  The variability and uncertainty of when a disaster will occur are major 
factors in these difficulties.  The Navy has the burden of weighing time, resources, and 
dollars against expeditiously providing HA/DR support.  Is the Navy providing the right 
level of support for HA/DR missions at the right time and for the right price?  What does 
a squadron need to be aware of that will better prepare it for unexpected disaster relief 
missions?  Will the U.S. military utilize the best possible helicopter resources to 
maximize its logistics efforts?   
The primary limiting factor in this research was the limited information on lessons 
learned specific to helicopter maintenance.  The Navy Warfare Development Center 
(NWDC) provided the Navy with lessons learned, but most of the data we collected from 
the NWDC did not give specific data for maintenance costs incurred during both HA/DR 
missions.  The NWDC is still gathering and organizing Haiti relief information in support 
of Operation Unified Response (OUR).  In addition to these limitations, HS-2 has since 
transitioned to another T/M/S helicopter, making it difficult to gather historical data on 
maintenance costs they incurred.  
E.  METHODOLOGY    
We began our analysis by reviewing numerous sources of information pertaining 
to the Indonesia and Haiti disaster relief efforts, as well as by reviewing U.S. Navy 
helicopter maintenance literature.  We consolidated all the data we collected to develop 
historical relevance and trends specific to HA/DR helicopter operations.  We began our 
analysis by reviewing numerous sources of information pertaining to the Indonesia and 
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Haiti disaster relief efforts, as well as by reviewing U.S. Navy helicopter maintenance 
literature.  We consolidated all the data we collected to develop historical relevance and 
trends specific to HA/DR helicopter operations.  Once we acquired the data, we built our 
model using tropical storm Ketsana as our example.  We then analyzed each model using 
a priority system that combined each T/M/S platforms maximum capability and CPH 
efficiency hierarchy.  Each model we used generated of the last model and we then 













For this review, we examined literature pertaining to humanitarian logistics.  It is 
important to understand the nature of each disaster and the sensitivity that time plays in 
providing relief support.  Understanding this will help with understanding the role of the 
long range heavy lift aircraft in sea basing and America’s role in past and current HA/DR 
missions.  We need to ensure we use the right resources to provide aid as quickly as 
possible as America’s role in HA/DR missions continue to grow.   
A.  METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the literature review, we introduce humanitarian logistic concepts, helicopter 
operations, and military operations.  The information provided in this review aids us in 
our descriptions of helicopter operations and in our comparison of two models of 
helicopters that supported HA/DR missions in Haiti and Indonesia. 
1. Humanitarian Logistics 
In Aruna Apte’s (2010) monograph, titled Humanitarian Logistics: A New Field 
of Research and Action, she discussed critical actions needed to execute effective 
humanitarian logistics when disasters strike.  Her monograph described how potential 
disaster responses involving the management of logistics are a major factor in preparing 
for humanitarian response, and she explained that it is necessary to understand disasters 
to understand humanitarian logistics (Apte, 2010). 
In Wassenhove’s (2006) article, Humanitarian aid logistics: Supply chain 
management in high gear, he states the importance of logistics operations and getting the 
right goods, to the right people, at the right place and at the right time.  He also feels that 
humanitarian organizations are beginning to become aware, as the private sector did over 
a decade ago, that logistics: 
• is crucial to the performance (effectiveness and speed) of current and future 
operations and programs; 
• serves as a bridge between disaster preparedness and response, between 
procurement and distribution, and between headquarters and the field; 
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• provides a rich source of data because it is this department that handles the 
tracking of goods (data that could be used to analyze post-event 
effectiveness); and 
• is the most expensive part of any relief operation and the part that can mean 
the difference between a successful or failed operation. 
2. Disaster Classifications 
It is important to know how difficult a particular humanitarian relief operation 
may be in order to classify a disaster based on time and location.  The basis of natural 
disaster classifications are preparation, prepositioning, and ongoing relief operations.  
Each of these three is normally in one of the four quadrants of Dr. Apte’s (2010) model 




Figure 1.   Classification of Disasters 







The classification descriptions are as follows: 
• Quadrant I: Localized and slow-onset.  This gives the preparation team time 
to catch up and stage the required logistics to help geographically contain 
the disaster.  
• Quadrant II: Dispersed and slow-onset.  Preparation for a disaster can help 
but prepositioning becomes a challenge.  It requires a substantial budget and 
enormous amounts of time to coordinate everyone involved and to ensure 
the delivery of the right amount of supplies to the right place at the right 
time.  Disaster response is the key to success for this quadrant.    
• Quadrant III: Localized and sudden-onset.  This creates problems in all 
three roles—preparation, prepositioning, and ongoing relief—due to the 
obvious uncertainties. However, because of the localization of the disaster, 
the level of operational difficulty, compared to the sudden and dispersed 
disasters in the fourth quadrant, is somewhat low. 
• Quadrant IV: Dispersed and sudden-onset.  This quadrant poses the most 
problems.  The sudden impact does not allow time to prepare or preposition, 
and the dispersed area makes it almost impossible to get the right supplies 
to the right areas at the right time. 
3.  Long-Range Heavy-Lift Aircraft to Enable Sea Basing  
The objective of sea basing is to have the ability to deliver supplies long distance 
by air without the use of truck convoys.  This strategy minimizes its footprint on foreign 
soil while reducing the demand of the already taxed airports and airfields.  Ground forces 
rely heavily on air support for logistical needs (National Research Council [NRC], 2005).  
During the Indonesia tsunami relief efforts, the U.S. military delivered 2.2 million pounds 
of relief supplies, consisting of 113,000 pounds of food, 16,000 gallons of water, and 
140,500 pounds of other supplies, within a 24-hour period.  The use of sea basing was 
critical in accomplishing this HA/DR mission due to the massive devastation that 
destroyed roads, bridges, and docks (Elleman, 2007). 
4. Logistics Productivity of Aircraft 
LTG Phillip Shutler, USMC, (Ret.) (1999), discussed aircraft productivity in sea 
base logistic support.  His research was based on combat situations, but the basic concept 
of sea-based operations can be linked directly to HA/DR missions.  In combat situations, 
having trucks positioned 225 miles from the ship, and having no knowledge of the safety 
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conditions of trucks or roads, are conditions common to HA/DR.  When conditions are 
unknown, rotary aircraft often deliver needed supplies and are instrumental in personnel 
evacuation.  The CH-53 is more than capable of carrying heavy loads and of landing 
where necessary in established landing zones.  The distance the aircraft can travel, the 
load it can carry and the amount of fuel it needs, all play important roles in deciding on 
the specific aircraft to use. 
Fuel conservation in logistics operations is always a major concern.  Transporting 
items, whether supplies or personnel, can be costly due to fuel expenses alone.  There is a 
direct tradeoff between useful load and fuel consumption for helicopters.  By reducing 
the fuel rate to just the amount needed for a particular mission, the helicopter can carry a 
useful load for very short distances.  When referring to no-load distances, the maximum 
flyable distance with one single passenger (PAX) determines this number.  This would be 
one trip under emergency conditions without refueling. 
B. MILITARY SUPPORT OF HA/DR BACKGROUND 
1. The Department of Defense’s Role in Foreign Assistance     
Opportunities to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and 
governments are developing through humanitarian assistance (Serafino, 2008).  Because 
of its manpower and assets, the DoD has always played a role in U.S. efforts to assist 
foreign governments and militaries. Congress, through legislation, has instituted a variety 
of authorizations to enable the DoD to carry out these activities.  The three purposes, 
historically, for which the DoD has provided foreign assistance are the following: 
1. Responding to humanitarian and basic needs. 
2. Building foreign military capacity and capabilities. 
3. Strengthening foreign governments’ ability to deal with internal and international 
threats through state-building measures. (Serafino, 2008, p. 1) 
When it comes to U.S. government organizations responding to natural or man-
made disasters, the DoD is normally the first agency to arrive.  Title 10 of the U.S. Code 
(U.S.C.) authorizes the DoD to provide assistance in humanitarian emergencies and 
recovery efforts. The DoD provides transportation, funding, or both, when necessary, for 
humanitarian assistance under Title 10. 
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10 U.S.C. § 2561 (Humanitarian Assistance, 2006) is the primary authority for the 
DoD to transport humanitarian supplies when a disaster occurs.  This code authorizes the 
DoD to appropriate funds when required for humanitarian assistance, specifically for 
providing transportation relief, as well as other worldwide humanitarian purposes.  The 
Secretary of State determines if this provision is used to order the DoD to provide 
specific assistance wherever it may be needed.  This assistance can include helicopter 
transportation, road and bridge repair, or delivery of temporary water supplies. The 
submission of an annual report to Congress notifying them of the use of the funds is 
mandatory.   
The Denton Amendment—or 10 U.S.C. § 402 (Transportation of Humanitarian 
Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries, 2006), which was named after former Senator 
Jeremiah Denton—authorizes the transport of privately donated humanitarian supplies 
and disaster assistance on U.S. military ships and aircraft on a space-available basis.  If 
any other U.S. government aid needs transportation, they reserve the right to bump the 
private donations from transport.  The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) must 
certify that private donations are appropriate for the specific HA/DR mission. 
The DoD also provides substantial emergency humanitarian relief assistance in a 
wide variety of other circumstances.  Sometimes in cooperation with and under the 
authorities of other agencies, the DoD provides humanitarian assistance, including food, 
shelter and supplies, medical evacuation, refugee assistance, logistical and operational 
support, and rehabilitation services (Serafino, 2008). 
2. Current History of Military Humanitarian Assistance 
The U.S. military has played a role in disaster relief efforts many times in the 
past.  Immediately following the 1906 earthquake and fire in San Francisco, the U.S. 
Army provided aid in response to the initial impact of the disaster (Burgess, 1957). In 
1991, the U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was returning home from Desert Storm 
but the U.S. Government diverted them to assist in disaster relief efforts (Cossa, 2005) in 
Bangladesh, which had just lost more than 130,000 people to a typhoon.  On January 12, 
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2005, approximately 15,000 U.S. military personnel were providing HA/DR assistance to 
tsunami victims in Indonesia (Elleman, 2007).  Throughout the past 100 years, the U.S. 
military has always made an effort to have a presence in both domestic and foreign 
disaster relief.   
3. Current U.S. Military Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster 
Response 
Naval service capabilities have continued to prove their effectiveness in disaster 
response missions like Operation Tomodachi, which was in response to the devastating 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan.  The normal use of these capabilities is to establish 
maritime security and project combat power.  U.S. forces were involved in 366 
humanitarian assistance missions between 1970 and 2000.  This number becomes much 
more significant when compared to the 22 combat missions during the same period 
(United States Marine Corps [USMC], United States Navy [USN], & United States Coast 
Guard [USCG], 2010).   
Expeditionary naval forces have training in crisis response operations with 
extreme circumstances and severe risks to the population.  Naval service mission 
readiness is enhanced through reactive HA/DR operations across a number of military 
operations.  The ability to employ expeditionary naval capabilities throughout a broad 
range of situations clearly demonstrates how the Navy is set up to respond to disasters 
and provide humanitarian assistance (USMC, USN, & USCG, 2010).  
4. Helicopter Use and Procurement 
The U.S. military continues to play a vital role in HA/DR worldwide and 
helicopters have been important to the success of past missions.  Helicopter support for 
worldwide U.S. military operations has seen an increase and expansion that is significant 
enough to call for changes in U.S. security and defense (Galdorisi & Truver, 2007).  
Helicopters once had the reputation of a less significant subset of operational war fighting 




stranded survivors or delivering sufficient supplies to provide needed relief in remote 
areas, HA/DR missions have started to place increased demands on the Navy helicopter 
community in recent years. 
Sea basing and the use of helicopters for logistic support have played a 
tremendous role in the U.S. military’s success.  Using a sea base for logistic support 
during various missions such as HA/DR support has become increasingly important in 
recent years.  The air connectors (i.e., helicopters) that the U.S. Military uses to support a 
sea base must have sufficient space to support the volume of cargo that must be 
transported in support of any high-tempo operations ashore (Galdorisi & Truver, 2007). 
Some of these high-tempo operations, such as HA/DR missions, have caused the 
DoD to respond with changes in the acquisition process for helicopter procurement.  
They are working towards adding assets that will give them better efficiency when it 
comes to fulfilling their assigned missions. 
5. Summary 
With each disaster classification causing various problems in providing 
humanitarian logistical support, it becomes evident that prepositioning supplies around 
the world and sending available resources as quickly as possible will determine how 
much of which demand we can fill.     
The U.S. Military has the assets needed to provide HA/DR and is very capable of 
assisting in HA/DR missions both domestically and in foreign nations.  Helicopter 
procurement needs to take into consideration HA/DR missions when deciding on future 
acquisitions.  Consideration for long-range heavy lift will be essential to the success of 
future missions.   
C. EXAMPLES OF NAVY HELICOPTER HA/DR OPERATIONS 
This chapter will discuss the Indonesia tsunami as well as the Haiti earthquake 
and how U.S. military aircraft played a vital role in both relief efforts.  The complexity of 
these disasters when combining multiple branches of the U.S. military located in multiple 
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areas operating together can be difficult.  The following sections will demonstrate their 
abilities to deliver the necessary supplies under these circumstances.      
1. Indonesian Tsunami 
At approximately 0600 on December 26, 2004, a 9.3 magnitude earthquake hit off 
the coast of Sumatra (CSF-536 Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)/Air 
Force Forces Commander (AFFOR), 2005).  The earthquake sent tsunamis tearing 
through the Indian Ocean, causing the death and disappearances of 295,000 people, while 
displacing an additional 400,000 people in eight different countries (USAID, 2005).  
Table 1 gives a snapshot of the death toll for each of the countries affected by the 
earthquake and tsunami. 
Thailand 5,400  
India 8,800  
Sri Lanka 30,000  
Andaman Islands 1,200  
Indonesia 240,000  
Malaysia 66  
Bangladesh 2  
Myanmar 90  
Maldives 75  
 
Table 1.   Death Totals Per Country (From USAID, 2005) 
After the initial assessment of the damage, Joint Task Force-536 designated the 
Utapao, Thailand, airport as the most capable airport to host the joint supply hub.  Within 
72 hours of the tsunami occurring, the joint supply hub was able to allow the American 
military to start delivering rescue supplies.  Over the 47 days of the mission, 102 aircraft 
from all four military branches, including 17 different T/M/S platforms delivered an 
average of 270 tons of rescue supplies each day (CSF-536 JFACC/AFFOR, 2005, p. 7).  




operated.  The average number of airlift relief tons flown per day during Operation 
Unified Assistance (OUA) exceeded that of any other humanitarian assistance or disaster 
relief operation since the Berlin Airlift. 
Location Type Service # of Aircraft 
Utaphao C-130 AF 8 
 
KC-130 Marines 2 
 
C-21 AF 1 
 
P-3 Navy 3 
Jakarta C-130 AF 4 
Langkawi MC-130H AF SOC 5 







Colombo HC-130 CG 2 
 
HH-60 AF 6 
Diego Garcia P-3 Navy 2 
Kadena KC-135 AF 2 
Futenma KC-130 Marines 2 
Global C-5 AF 6 




Table 2.   Land Based Aircraft 
The OUA aircraft were operating from nine different land bases (Utapao, Jakarta, 
Langkawi, Paya Lebar, Colombo, Diego Garcia, Kadena, Futenma, and Global) and five 
sea bases (USS Abraham Lincoln, USS Bonhomme Richard, USS Duluth, USS Fort 
McHenry and USS Niagara Falls).  Table 3 lists the service branch and the type of sea 
based helicopters used.  Using the hub-and-spoke delivery method, all incoming rescue 
supplies flew into the Utapao airport to be unloaded, sorted, and then transported to the 





Location Type Service 
# of 
Aircraft 
ALCSG M/SH-60 Navy 16 
BHRSEG CH-46 Marine 9 
 
CH-53 Marine 4 
 
M/SH-60 Marine 6 
 
UH-1 Marine 3 
Duluth CH-46 Marine 3 
Ft McHenry CH-46 Marine 4 




Table 3.   Sea Based Aircraft 
2. Haiti Earthquake 
At 21:53 UTC on January 12, 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck off the 
Coast of Haiti, 16 miles west of the Port-au-Prince airport, with the region surrounding 
the airport receiving the most damage.  The severity of this earthquake devastated the 
country as a whole, causing over 230,000 fatalities and 196,500 injuries, and displacing 
over 1,200,000 people.  The earthquake destroyed a large portion of villages and 
government infrastructure, including homes, schools, and the Ministry Headquarters 
(Joint Center for Operational Analysis [JCOA], 2010).    
In order to support relief efforts, the U.S. government designated U.S. Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM) as the supporting military command and started operating 
Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF–H).  The JTF–H established Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), 
Cuba as the designated joint supply hub to run the hub-and-spoke network to distribute 
disaster supplies to the needed areas of Haiti.  Due to the enormous scale of operations 
for the Haiti mission, the help of 140 countries, 1,000 non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), 22,000 U.S. military personnel to include 33 ships and 41 aircraft, were used to 
aid in the HA/DR mission (JCOA, 2010).  The aircraft used were operating from one 
airfield, 40 landing zones, and three sea bases, which included the USS Carl Vinson, USS 
Nassau, and USS Bataan.  Using the hub-and-spoke delivery method, all incoming 
rescue supplies flew into the GTMO airfield to be unloaded, sorted, and then transported 
to the various landing zones for distribution as needed.  Table 4 from Commander, 
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Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Atlantic (CHSCWL) provides a description of how many 
of each T/M/S platforms and ships being used as a sea base. 
 
Figure 2.   CHSCWL Haiti Force Summary (From Monagle, 2011) 
D. U.S. NAVY HELICOPTER RESOURCES FOR HA/DR 
The U.S. Navy uses various types of aircraft designed for specific types of 
missions.  They each have size, speed, weight and space limitations which come into play 
when deciding which type we should use for HA/DR missions.  Each one brings 
something different to the mission that we will further explore in this section. 
1. H-60 Helicopter Background 
H-60 helicopter utilization has been a part of naval aviation since 1983 when the 
SH-60B was introduced (Federation of American Scientists [FAS], 2010b).  There are 
several H-60 variations used for different mission purposes, including anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), search and rescue (SAR), and cargo lift.  
The SH-60B’s configuration is primarily for Light Airborne Multipurpose System 
(LAMPS) missions for the Navy.  These helicopters are normally onboard cruisers, 
frigates, and destroyers.   
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The HH-60H and the SH-60F are utilized onboard the aircraft carriers.  There is 
normally one squadron comprised of six to eight of these aircraft.  The primary mission 
of the HH-60H is combat search and rescue (CSAR) and naval special warfare support.  
The primary mission of the SH-60F is to detect, classify, and destroy hostile submarines 
by using ASW.  CSAR and naval special warfare support are the secondary missions of 
the SH-60F.  Both helicopter types can also perform other missions such as logistics 
support (LOG), vertical replenishment (VERTREP), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), 
SAR, and ASUW.   The helicopters have a maximum gross weight of 21,885 pounds.  
The Navy is now in the process of implementing the MH-60R and the MH-60S 
into its inventory.  The MH-60R’s design combines the capabilities of the HH-60H and 
SH-60F, while the MH-60S has replaced the SH-60B.  Having the Carrier Air Wing 
restructured will now allow for two H-60 squadrons with 19 helicopters.  There will now 
be a mix of nine MH-60S/R helicopters onboard the carrier with the other 11 disbursed 
throughout the rest of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG).  The helicopter has a maximum 
gross weight of 22,500 pounds.     
2.  H-53 Helicopter Background 
The CH-53E operates off amphibious assault ships designed to transport 
personnel, supplies, and equipment in support of amphibious assault operations.  It is 
normally carried onboard LHA, LHD, and Landing Platform, Helicopter (LPH) type 
ships.  Designed to operate day and night, even in adverse weather conditions, the 
helicopter has the capability to transport items either internally or externally.  The Marine 
Corps fleet of CH-53E is presently being considering as a medium lift helicopter (FAS, 
2010a). 
The CH-53E normally seats 37 passengers, but with centerline seats 
installed, it has the ability to seat 55 passengers.  The helicopter has a maximum gross 
weight of 73,500 pounds but has a maximum weight on wheels of 69,750 pounds.   
3.  H-46 Helicopter Background 
The CH-46E Sea Knight is a medium-lift helicopter that operates on amphibious 
assault ships alongside the CH-53E, transporting troops, supplies, and equipment in 
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support of amphibious operations.  Other mission tasks this helicopter can provide are 
over-water search and rescue augmentation, as well as MEDEVAC of casualties to 
suitable medical facilities.  The Sea Knight is currently in the process of a phase-out, with 
the MV-22 Osprey as its replacement. 
The Sea Knight has a maximum gross weight of 24,300 pounds either internally 
or externally.  Passenger capacity is 25, and for MEDEVAC purposes, is 15 litters with 
two attendants.  Range for the Sea Knight is 132 nautical miles with a speed of 145 knots.  
The helicopter has a maximum interval of continuous mission operations that is not to 
exceed eight hours, meaning that the helicopter continues hot refueling without stopping 
the rotors during the mission.  This can be a possible issue when determining the distance 
needed to travel and the load/unload timeframe needed for certain missions.   
4.  MV-22 Helicopter Background 
The MV-22 Osprey is a medium-lift tilt-rotor aircraft, giving it the combined 
capabilities of a Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) and the speed range, range, and 
service ceiling of a turboprop airplane.  Some of the mission tasks of the Osprey include 
emergency evacuation and MEDEVAC of casualties to suitable medical facilities.  It also 
provides fleet logistics support, which includes long range and shore support.   The size 
and abilities make the aircraft a valuable asset to HA/DR missions which Marines may 
support.   
Maximum VTOL gross weight for the Osprey is 52,600 pounds, while Short 
Takeoff (STO) has a gross weight of 57,000 pounds.  The aircraft’s passenger capacity 
rates at 24, with the ability to carry 12 litter patients with four medical attendants.  
5.  Summary 
This chapter discussed the capabilities of the four aircraft commonly used by the 
U.S. Navy in HA/DR missions.  Each platform specializes in certain missions but have 




what the CH-53 can carry but its smaller size gives it the capability to get in to smaller 
areas.  The CH-46 and the MV-22 have the same passenger capabilities but the MV-22 
has a higher gross weight.      
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III. CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST 
DISASTERS 
Previous HA/DR missions provide lessons learned to help correct any issues and 
find better ways to accomplish a mission.  We retrieved lessons learned from the NWDC, 
and we performed a cross-case analysis to determine if the Navy repeats some of the 
same issues detailed in the lessons learned.  In our analysis, we discovered very few of 
the same issues, which could suggest issues occurred because of national security 
reasons, because of procurement problems, or because the problem was only relevant to 
the specific disaster area.   
One common theme that continuously came up in the lessons learned was 
communication.  Everything done in the military is planned and briefed to ensure that all 
of those involved know their responsibilities.  However, how and when the military briefs 
differs between the Navy and the DoD.  Communication between the Carrier Air Wing 
(CVW) staff, aircraft carrier operations department, beach detachment personnel, landing 
zones (LZs), supply depots, and NGOs is a very complicated process, and it is difficult to 
ensure everyone is on the same communication network.  Having a reliable 
communications network can play a vital role in helicopter operations during HA/DR 
missions.  The ability to have helicopters in the correct place, with the correct supplies, 
and at the correct time can make a huge difference in the success of the entire mission. 
A. INDONESIA 
The Department of the Navy was able to collect valuable lessons learned data 
from the Indonesia tsunami that will be able to assist them in HA/DR missions.  It will be 
evident later in the chapter when we discuss Haiti, that they repeat very few of the same 
mistakes but still have the same underlying issues such as communication and training. 
1. Communication Lessons from Indonesia  
Communicating the proper location on which to focus relief efforts required a 
combination of working with government officials, watching news coverage, and 
listening to the recommendations from the survey teams.  During the Indonesian tsunami 
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relief, some villages set up their own communication network by hanging up colored 
flags to indicate what type of supplies the villagers needed (JLLIS, 2008d). 
Aircrew debriefs on safe and acceptable landing zones were critical to the tsunami 
relief success.  Intelligence officers on board the aircraft carrier updated charts and 
kneeboards with latitude and longitude information to ensure aircrew flew directly to safe 
LZs to drop off supplies.  Quickly setting up a communication network with NGOs for 
safely flying in and out of the Area of Operation (AOR) helps ensure the NGOs safely 
arrive at their destination while keeping them from interfering and slowing down 
helicopter support operations (JLLIS 2008d).  
2. Production Lessons from Indonesia 
Personnel transport is as much of a priority in HA/DR missions as the movement 
of supplies.  The SH-60 helicopter’s design is for ASW, SAR, anti-ship warfare, cargo 
lift, and special operations.  In response to the ever increasing numbers of HA/DR 
missions, the SH-60 has added another mission aspect to its list of uses for naval air 
support.  During Operation Unified Assistance (OUA), a lesson learned was that the 
configuration for air wing carrier-based helicopters was not for PAX transfer, but after 
reconfiguration, was more suitable for this purpose. 
Three versions of the SH-60, as well as the MH-60, participated in OUA and all 
configurations were different, giving each one different maximum PAX capacities.  A 
description of the aircraft T/M/S, normal gear used or internal equipment, and PAX 
















Sonabouy Launchers and 
Magnetic Anomaly  3 4 - 5 
SH-60F 
Dipping Sonar and 
Reeling Machine 4 4 - 6 
SH-60H 
Configured for SAR 
Missions  4 6 - 13 
MH-60 
Configured for Vertical 
Replenishment  4 21 
Table 4.   Maximum Passenger Capacity 
Removing extra equipment from the helicopters would double the maximum PAX 
capacity these aircraft could carry (JLLIS, 2008c).  Reconfiguration of these aircraft took 
minimal time and the adaptations had very little impact on the aircraft’s operational 
capabilities.  Even though these aircraft were easy to reconfigure in a minimal time 
period, having aircraft already configured would save even more time in relief efforts.  
The use of rotary-wing aircraft allowed Expeditionary Strike Group Five (ESG-5) 
to effectively and efficiently deliver bulk HA/DR supplies along the northwest coast of 
Indonesia directly to those in need.  During a 15-day period, ESG-5 was able to deliver 
approximately 1.5 million pounds of supplies to the tsunami-battered Indonesian people.  
Because members of ESG-5 were able to leapfrog bottlenecks and inefficiencies ashore, 
they maximized delivery of HA/DR supplies (JLLIS 2008e). 
The Navy designated Singapore as the main logistics hub for the purpose of sea 
basing during the relief efforts in Indonesia.  CLF ships loaded with HA/DR supplies 
would travel the Straits of Malacca from Singapore to the relief operating area (ROA) 
assigned.  Rotary-wing aircraft played a vital role in relief efforts by permitting naval 
commanders to exploit their advantages.  The aircraft delivered supplies directly to the 
areas affected.  Isolated pockets of survivors were able to receive relief assistance from 
the rotary-wing aircraft, which could reach the survivors along the coast and the river 
valley leading inland.  Logistics efforts operated best through the sea, minimizing touch 
points and therefore maximizing the amount of timely relief provided to survivors (JLLIS 
2008f).  
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The sole use of helicopters from the USS Abraham Lincoln was to aid relief 
missions when they first arrived in theater.  As the operation progressed and more ships 
arrived in theater, the helicopters began doing more PAX and mail movement, taking 
them away from relief missions.  Supporting some of the distinguished visitor (DV) and 
media flights eventually affected resource allocation because some of these flights 
required standby helicopters to be turning and ready to go.  Generation of flight schedules 
occurred late in the evening for the next day’s flight operations.  Many times, after the 
flight schedules were generated, there were deviations, causing issues with helicopter 
asset management.  The carrier’s operations department needs to be able to factor in the 
DVs and media to ensure that the HA/DR mission is not affected (JLLIS 2006a). 
3.  Evacuation Lessons from Indonesia 
The tsunami in Indonesia destroyed much of the road infrastructure in the ROA, 
as well as the Indonesian medical infrastructure.  Helicopters played a vital role in 
transporting displaced personnel requiring medical attention.  Time is a major factor in 
the saving of a life, but because the USS Mercy was not equipped with its own 
helicopters to air lift patients, it had to rely on U.S. helicopters to make these transports, 
preventing the use of these helicopters for other missions.  If the Mercy had its own 
helicopters, it could have directly supported the mission of supplying medical assistance 
at a quick and constant pace (JLLIS 2008a). 
4.  Training and Environmental Lessons from Indonesia 
 Helicopter Anti-submarine Squadron Light (HSL) aircrew lacked the required 
training to perform confined-area landings.  Putting aircrew in this situation placed them 
at a higher risk in an already high-risk situation.  In order to overcome this situation, 
senior aircrew conducted the training onsite.  Training aircrew to perform confined-area 
landings before a deployment can allow pilots to be ready for these types of situations 
and prevents the waste of valuable time that could be focused on the HA/DR mission 
(JLLIS 2006b). 
The safety of the helicopter aircrew is always a concern for relief commanders 
during relief efforts.  It is important that the aircrew’s briefings are proper prior to a 
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mission on the AOR to try to minimize any disrespect or apparent insensitivity to the 
local residents.  During the Indonesian tsunami relief, there was some concern about the 
religious connotations of using the Red Cross symbol rather than a red crescent, due to 
the large Muslim population in the area (JLLIS2008b). 
The United Nations (UN) relied on other organizations such as the U.S. to deliver 
supplies early in the response effort.  The United Nations stated that it would have 12 to 
15 helicopters to help support helicopter operations, but they were only able to supply 
seven in theater throughout the mission (JLLIS, 2008f). 
 B. HAITI 
We can see in the lessons learned from the Haiti earthquake that the Navy has 
learned some lessons from previous disasters but continue to have the same underlying 
issues in communication and training.  This could attest to the fact that each HA/DR 
mission is different and has certain aspects that must be handled differently. 
1. Communication Lessons from Haiti 
E-mail, local cell phones, and other communication devices are most likely down 
after a disaster strikes—as demonstrated in the recent Haiti earthquake disaster.  When 
the use of OCONUS and BlackBerry cell phones is necessary, it takes approximately a 
month to acquire the proper overseas data package for the cell phone to work.  Because 
HA/DR missions are so hard to predict, it is very hard to acquire this capability in such a 
short period.  The recommendation is that each sea-based command has its own unlocked 
global systems for mobile (GSM) phones. It has become common for the military to use 
BlackBerry phones with GSM to send text messages and e-mails for communication.  In 
addition, the Navy uses these phones as modems that multiple computers can link to and 
send e-mails from them.  However, the BlackBerry has had problems with 
communicating sensitive information sometimes considered classified information 
(JLLIS, 2010h).  
During the Haiti relief efforts, it was realized that the air plan from the aircraft 
carrier and the surface plan from the amphibious ships needed to be published in a timely 
manner to facilitate the ships’ planning for the next day’s missions.  Amphibious ship and 
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helicopter movements needed to be staggered in order to avoid any conflict between the 
two.  When amphibious ships and helicopters do not communicate properly, it can lead to 
missed delivery of supplies or transport of personnel needed to complete the HA/DR 
missions.  This is why it is important to avoid assuming that the surface and air plan have 
been de-conflicted to account for cargo and PAX movement (JLLIS, 2010m).   
When relief personnel were distributing supplies to local churches, organizations, 
and groups, many of those needing relief attempted to obtain more than allotted to their 
group.  As a result, it became crucial to track the recipients of the HA/DR supplies that 
were delivered. Obtaining addresses and other forms of information made it much easier 
to track who got which supplies and when (JLLIS, 2010f). 
Having a separate transmission frequency devoted to aircraft mission 
communications could possibly reduce the transmission traffic and allow for a better flow 
of communication and setting of priorities for aircrew.  During OUR, aircrews often had 
the task of transporting personnel or supplies, and they sometimes discovered, after 
arriving at the LZ, that another helicopter had just taken the personnel or supplies away. 
This miscommunication wasted precious time and resources that could have been better 
used supporting the mission (JLLIS, 2010e).   
2.  Production Lessons from Haiti 
During the Haiti relief efforts, the best mix of medium lift (e.g., MH-60S) and 
heavy lift (e.g., CH-53E) helicopters depended on the specific landing zone area.  The 
ability to get into densely populated areas with the MH-60 proved to be valuable in Haiti.  
Limited use of the CH-53 in these areas was mainly due to the rotor backwash.  After the 
first few days, relief personnel were able to move more of the relief supplies by ground 
and to start using the aircraft more for personnel and patient transport. 
The space and heavy lift capability of the CH-53 make it valuable when 
communication ground lines are not available and when there is a need for amphibious 
lift to move supplies.  The MH-60 serves better in concentrated disaster areas where 
logistics depend on intact lines of communications.  It is important for the area 
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commander of a disaster relief mission to assess the needs of a particular disaster for 
better assignment of aircraft to HA/DR task forces.  
The SH-60 provides airlift support and supplies over short distances, confined 
spaces, or sloping landing areas. Its small cargo and PAX area limit its operational 
capacity.  The CH-53 specializes in transporting large amounts of supplies and personnel.  
However, due to its need for a large landing area, the CH-53 will normally only fly to and 
from the ships and airfields for their assigned missions (JLLIS, 2010c).  This limits its 
ability to reach confined areas in need of relief. 
Air Transit Office (ATO) requirements significantly increase during HA/DR 
missions.  During the first two weeks of the Haiti HA/DR mission, the ATO facilitated 
the movement of over 8,100 personnel and 2.9 million pounds of cargo (JLLIS, 2010d).  
This is not a part of the normal operations of a CVN during a deployment.  The process 
of effectively operating the ship, as a sea base is considerably different from cyclic 
operations the ship normally conducts underway.  Communication between air operations 
and the ATO are critical to efficient operations and this is difficult when you are 
supporting more personnel and cargo than normal.  The ATO should be augmented by 
both junior and senior personnel to effectively operate in the HA/DR environment. 
Relief supplies were arriving to Guantanamo (GTMO) base supply faster than the 
Joint Logistics Hub (JLH) could process them.  This increased the need for operators for 
material handling equipment such as K-loaders and 10K and 6K forklifts.  This shortage 
could have caused excessive delays in handling, processing, and shipping materials to 
specific disaster areas.  The cooperation between the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) and the 
JLH minimized the impact by transferring personnel from the ship to work at the JLH. In 
the future, all JLHs will need augmentation with the proper qualified personnel to handle 
the additional workload (JNLLIS. 2010g). 
Having the right amount of support equipment and qualified personnel to operate 
is essential.  During OUR, there was only one aircraft power cart and liquid oxygen cart 
available to support 13 aircraft forward deployed to GTMO, impacting the squadron’s 
ability to perform maintenance until more support equipment arrived.  There is a need for 
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the proper accounting of additional personnel and support equipment, especially those 
pertaining to maintenance, when standing up forward deployed HA/DR bases (JLLIS, 
2010a). 
The way items from the various organizations were packaged made it difficult at 
times to move and deliver the relief items.  One example was the donated water bottles, 
which came in a variety of packaging.  Water bottles taped together became very hard to 
palletize and stack compared to bottles received in boxes.  These taped water bottles 
eventually fell off the pallets and broke open on the decks during transport up and down 
the ramps (JLLIS, 2010o).  Shrink-wrapped cargo received from commercial vendors and 
pallets stacked higher than recommended safe levels, caused pallets to fall during vertical 
replenishment, creating a safety issue for personnel and the aircraft (JLLIS, 2010k). 
During the initial rush to push large amounts of relief supplies to Haiti, the Navy 
accepted responsibility for transporting cargo that required very specific delivery 
requirements for NGOs. These special delivery requirements resulted in command-level 
planners managing public relations with the consigners back in the U.S. and the media 
attached to the cargo.  These parties could not readily understand the delay in the 
transportation of this cargo ashore.  As spare helicopter sorties became available, the 
Navy moved the cargo to the designated position.  Planners who accept cargo with very 
specific destinations on behalf of NGOs, such as an address or latitude and longitude, 
need to take into account the logistical impact of delivering this cargo.  Accepting this 
type of cargo may actually slow the flow of time-critical HA/DR supplies. It may be 
beneficial to condition the acceptance of such cargo on the ability to transport it to a 
location decided upon by the commander of the task group (JLLIS, 2010i). 
Although the advertised water production capacity of the aircraft carrier is 
400,000 gallons per day, the realistic capacity for producing, packaging, transporting, and 
distributing the water is significantly less.  Initially, when the aircraft carrier arrived, 
there was no capability to distribute water produced because there were no containers in 
which to ship it.  Subsequently, shipments of five-gallon containers and collapsible water 
flasks allowed distribution of larger quantities of water, but the shipments were then 
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limited by the lift capability of aircraft conducting sorties from the ship.  Even in the best 
case, the capacity to deliver water remained significantly below the 400,000 gallon-per-
day capability of the ship (JLLIS, 2010n). 
3. Evacuation Lessons from Haiti 
The USS Carl Vinson advertised its ability to accommodate up to 50 medical 
beds, but available doctors and equipment limits its real capability to handle injuries from 
severe disasters.  With limited surgical capacity, the real throughput of the ship is 
significantly less than advertised.  MEDEVAC patients use a significant number of the 
helicopters available for use when supporting HA/DR missions.  The Navy could 
supplement the aircraft carrier and other medical facilities with additional doctors and 
equipment for a more efficient mission.  During OUR, even when a sufficient number of 
doctors and supply of equipment supplies arrived on the USNS Comfort, which had an 
advertised capacity of 1,000 beds, it was learned that 400 of those beds were bunk style 
and not suitable for non-ambulatory patients (JLLIS, 2010n). 
In extreme circumstances, the flight deck can operate for longer durations at the 
cost of increased risk of mishaps due to deck crew fatigue.  High demand for air assets 
routinely requires more than the 10-hour limit.  In the early phases of Operation Unified 
Response, the operational tempo drove flight operations routinely beyond the 10-hour 
Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA/LHD) Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures 
Standardization (NATOPS) limit for continuous flight operations.  Additionally, the ships 
needed to fly numerous single-spot MEDEVAC responses in the middle of the night.  
This required activation of the deck crew during what would normally be their down 
time.  Augmentation of the air department onboard the ship is a necessity prior to 
deploying for HA/DR contingency operations.  This mitigates the risk of unpredictable 
flight operations.  Increasing the number of flight deck personnel from the waterfront 
ships by 20 would greatly enhance deck-operating capability and reduce the risk of injury 
or mishap (JLLIS, 2010l). 
During the opening days of Operation Unified Response, the mass causality 
situation resulting from the earthquake quickly overwhelmed the medical capability on 
the scene.  Request for MEDEVAC flights far exceeded the available air assets.  USNS 
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Comfort became the central point for all evacuation requests.  USNS Comfort requested 
air assets through Tactical Air Control Squadron Two One (TACRON 21), which in turn 
assigned missions without any prioritization or precedence. The on-scene medical 
assessment lacked the details necessary to prioritize effectively.  Many times, the U.S. 
Navy sent several assets to the same request because no tracking system was in place.  
MEDEVAC requests were incomplete, missing important information, including pick-up 
location, destination, number of patients, and the time the patient would be ready for 
transport.  Aircraft tasking was haphazard and aircrews were pushing the limits of safety 
and operational risk management (ORM).  Without prioritization, the treatment of each 
MEDEVAC case was as if it were urgent, when in fact many patients could have waited.  
In multiple cases, aircraft rushed to LZs only to find that patients were not there yet, or 
that the LZ information was incorrect.  This wasted valuable resources that could been 
better-used expediting supplies or MEDEVACS in need of immediate attention (JLLIS, 
2010b). 
A temporary helicopter shelter was installed onboard the USNS Comfort, which 
kept the flight deck from being used to its full potential.  The shelter housed and provided 
maintenance for an air detachment of two MH-60s that were onboard for medical airlift.  
When the flight decks of the Carl Vinson and the USS Bataan were not available, having 
the helicopters on the Comfort allowed for some operational flexibility. 
4.  Training and Environmental Lessons from Haiti 
Military forces working from a sea base deliver effective support at the onset of 
the crisis and leave a minimal footprint ashore.  During the Haiti mission, Marines 
supported by the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) helicopters, could return to their 
ships at night, thereby reducing negative perceptions of American imperialism or a 
military takeover of the humanitarian mission (JLLIS, 2010j. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented challenges and lessons learned from the relief efforts 
in Indonesia and Haiti pertaining to the US military airlift response.  Indonesia was the 
first of the two events to occur, but some of the same issues persisted five years later in 
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Haiti.  Both efforts shared a few of the same basic problems with communication, 
operations, and training that caused scheduling complications with helicopter operations 
or the over-demand of helicopter use during helicopter operations and slowed down relief 
efforts.  It is important that the DoD take these lessons and challenges into consideration 
when it plans and trains for future HA/DR missions.  Improving efficiency and 
preventing the relief workers from making the same mistakes is important when 












IV. MODELING IN SUPPORT OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
Every natural disaster has the possibility to present a unique and dynamic 
logistical problem.  The strength, speed, and devastation of a natural disaster are a few of 
the things that will determine how many rescue supplies, as well as the number of victim 
transports needed to support a disaster relief mission. It is important to make a timely 
decision to identify the needed resources in order to send them to the disaster area as 
quickly as possible.  This timely decision will help to determine how quickly the delivery 
process will happen.  By analyzing the similarities and differences of the CSG and the 
ARG, we prepared a cross-case analysis (Mathison, 2005) to evaluate the effectiveness of 
helicopter operations in disaster relief missions.  Before we can analyze each T/M/S 
platform in our model we needed to establish what kind of disaster we are dealing with, 
and how much time does the DOD has to put together a response. 
A. MODEL DISASTER SCENARIO 
The model we used a Quadrant III, localized and sudden onset disaster, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  The disaster scenario we model begins with a satellite picking up 
a tropical storm in the Pacific Ocean.  Weather experts are confident that this tropical 
storm will hit a specific island.  The Navy reviews its available resources and sends a 
CSG from the Seventh Fleet and an ARG from the Fifth Fleet for possible assistance.  
Because of the advanced warning of this potential disaster, it allows the CSG to arrive on 
scene two days after the storm hits (D+2) and the ARG to arrive on day 7 (D+7).  Upon 
arrival, the Disaster Relief Assessment Team (DRAT) informs the rescue team that there 
is a local population of 3,000,000, with 420,000 displaced personnel and over 3,700 
people who need to be MEDEVAC to safety.  The DRAT informs the U.S. Military that 
all of the main roads leading to the affected areas are flooded and the only way to get aid 
to the area is by helicopter.  There is a supply hub set up on a nearby island that has a 




zone for helicopters to transport personnel and supplies in and out.  After receiving all of 
the necessary information, the CSG begins flight operations as it waits for other support 
platforms to arrive on scene. 
B. OVERVIEW OF MODEL 
The purpose of this model is to answer the question, how can we be more efficient 
in meeting the overall demands of the HA/DR mission? To get at this question, we 
constructed the model to help identify key areas in which we could improve the 
efficiency of the Navy and Marine Corps delivery process.  This overview explains how 
we obtained, used, and analyzed the research information we included in the model.  
1. Helicopter Raw Data 
Using information gathered from program managers and data analysts from Naval 
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), as well as the official NAVAIR website 
(www.navair.navy.mil), the setup of the model took into consideration the following 
information for the SH-60, H-46, H-53 and MV-22 performing operations during a 
HA/DR mission.  The Max Cargo Weight and Max Passenger Capacity information is 
from the specific T/M/S platforms NATOPS manuals.  Table 5 describes each type of 









Aircraft Mission Capable Percentage Due to planned and unplanned maintenance, 
it is very rare to have 100% of the aircraft on 
scene to be mission capable.   
Ao (Operational Availability) The number of aircraft available multiplied by 
the mission capable percentage of that day.  
This number will decide the percentage of 
how many aircraft will fly each route.  Ao will 
change when specific T/M/S platforms 
experience MC degradation (OPNAVINST 
3000.12A, 2003). 
Max Cargo Weight (MCW) The amount in pounds of how many supplies 
each T/M/S can carry and safely deliver in that 
environment.  This number will change 
depending on the temperature, humidity and 
winds.   
Max Passenger Capability This is the number of passengers that each 
T/M/S can safely carry. 
Aircraft Available on Scene Depending on where each ship was when 
given the order to respond to the HA/DR 
mission will determine when, what type and 
how many aircraft show up. 
Table 5.   Helicopter Input Data Types 
2. Timeline 
The use of a timeline was to help determine when response resources, such as the 
CSG and ARG with the various T/M/S platforms, arrive and depart on the scene.  Day 0 
(D+0) was the day of the disaster.  Day 14 (D+14) was the last day of flight operations in 
support of the mission that we modeled.  Because of the fact that the various T/M/S 
aircraft are coming from different geographical locations, it was important to be able to 
assess the impact of different arrival timeframes. 
3. Demand  
Demand was broken down into six separate categories.  Displaced personnel, 
overall water, critical survival water, food, MEDEVACs and medical supplies were the 
items needing attention in the model.  Knowing the demand was necessary to determine 
efficient responses. 
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a. Displaced Personnel 
Before understanding how we calculated the other demands, we needed to 
calculate the number of displaced people who need water, food, medical supplies, 
MEDEVAC, and transportation to a safe area from the total population.  We did not use 
information from Indonesia or Haiti since their disasters derived from earthquakes and 
our model uses a tropical storm.  By using data from fact sheets on Tropical Storm 
Ketsana, we were able to develop percentages of displaced personnel (USAID, 2009).   
Multiplying the total affected population of 3,000,000 by the 14% 
calculated from the fact sheets, we arrived at the number of 420,000 displaced people that 
need water, food, medical supplies and transportation.  It is important to remember that 
the number of displaced drives the overall daily demand in the model.  The displaced 
daily demand dropped by 1.5% of the total affected population each day, which 
ultimately dropped the daily water and food demands by the same percentage (USAID, 
2009).   
b. Overall Water 
The USAID field guide recommends 8.5 gallons of water a person per 
day, which converts to 70 pounds of water per displaced person a day.  This total includes 
the total amount of water needed to stay hydrated, cook, and bathe.  By multiplying the 
number of displaced personnel by the 70 pounds needed per day, we calculated 
29,400,000 pounds of water demanded for the first day (USAID, 2005).  This percentage 
drops as the displacement percentage drops every day. 
c.  Critical Survival Water 
The USAID field guide recommends that each person needs 1/5th of their 
total water needs for hydration purposes.  This model focuses on how quickly we can 
meet the critical survival water demand. In order to calculate this demand we divide the 
total water demand by five.  Therefore, with the total water demand for the day at 
29,400,000 pounds of water, then we divided the daily demand by five, which resulted in 
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5,880,000 pounds of critical survival water needed on the first day of flight operations.  
This percentage drops as the displacement percentage drops every day. 
d. Food 
The food demand calculations derive from the USAID field guide manual 
which sets a requirement of 540 grams per person per day (USAID, 2005), or 1.2 pounds 
of food per person a day.  By multiplying, 420,000 by 1.2 you get a demand of 504,000 
pounds of food on the first day of operations.  This percentage drops as the displacement 
percentage drops every day. 
e. MEDEVAC 
 We calculated MEDEVAC demand by using .0009% of the total 
population displaced by using MEDEVAC data from fact sheets on Tropical Storm 
Ketsana (USAID, 2009).  With 420,000 displaced and multiplying it by the .0009%, we 
found that 378 people would need immediate medical attention and transportation to the 
supply hub as soon as possible.  The MEDEVAC demand does not drop by the same 
percentage as the displaced percentage drops.  MEDEVAC demand not met rolls into the 
next day’s MEDEVAC demand.  This continues until all MEDEVACs to the hub are 
complete. 
f. Medical Supplies 
 By using data from fact sheets on Tropical Storm Ketsana, we were able to 
develop percentages of MEDEVAC personnel (USAID, 2009).  Because of the lack of 
information, we assumed that one out of every ten people who need medical attention 
would need to be MEDEVAC.  Therefore, if 378 people need to be MEDEVAC, we 
multiplied that number by 10 we came up with 3,780 people who needed standard 
medical attention.  We then multiplied the 3,780 people by 1.22 pounds a day per person, 
giving a product of 4,612 pounds of medical supplies needed on the first day of 
operations (Department of the Army Headquarters, 1990).  Due to previous medicine 
delivered and people receiving treatment, we assumed that this demand would drop twice 
as fast as the displacement percentage. 
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4. Mission Capability Percentage 
We requested mission capability percentage (MC%) information from the 
Warfighter Response Center located on the NAVAIR website at www.navair.navy.mil 
for each T/M/S platform.  Each T/M/S platform was not able to provide the same number 
of years’ worth of data.  We took the average mission capable percentage of all years 
available for the SH-60, H-46, H-53, and MV-22, which were 68%, 75%, 76% and 67%, 
respectively.  The mission capability percentage ultimately drives how many aircraft are 
available for use.  If each T/M/S platform had the same number of aircraft, the T/M/S 
platform with the higher MC% would have more aircraft available for use than a T/M/S 
platform with a lower MC%. 
As flight hours increase during the missions, there is a potential for an increase in 
maintenance failures on the aircrafts.  The local supply systems on the ships do not have 
the inventory to support a drastic increase in failed aircraft items.  This increase would be 
due to increased HA/DR flight missions, in which the aircraft experience almost three 
times as many flight hours as normal.  This increase in failed items depletes the local 
supply system, which lowers the mission capability percentage.  To approximate the 
effects of increased maintenance failures, we modeled a MC% degradation of 10% every 
five days of flying. 
5. Routes and Route Capacity 
In our scenario, flight operations run between three main areas, which are the 
supply hub, the ship, and an LZ within the disaster area.  The three areas are located 
approximately 10 nautical miles (11.5 miles) from each other.  In the disaster scenario, 
the LZ has been severely flooded and is in need of transporting in food, water, and 
medical supplies, as well as transporting out injured and displaced people.  Because of 
the damage to the infrastructure, helicopters were determined to be the best means of 
transportation for the relief mission.  The supply hub serves as the primary distribution 




displaced people.  The ship supplies all water demand.  The model uses four 
possible routes to handle the transportation demands of the disaster.  These routes 
are described in Table 6.  
 
Route Route Type Route Description  
1 Ship to LZ to Ship On this route, they load water on the ship, 
unload at the LZ, return empty to Ship. 
2 Ship to LZ to Hub to Ship On this route the designated helicopter 
loads water on the Ship, unloads water at 
the LZ and loads up MEDEVAC and/or 
displacements, unloads them at the 
Supply Hub and then returns to the ship. 
3 Ship to Hub to LZ to Ship On the route, there is no loading of water 
on the ship. They fly empty to the Hub, 
load food and medical supplies at the 
Hub, unload food/medical supplies at LZ, 
and then return to the ship. 
4 Ship to Hub to LZ to Hub to 
Ship 
On this route, there is no loading on the 
ship. They fly empty to the Hub, load food 
and medical supplies at the hub, unload at 
LZ and load MEDEVAC/Displacements, 
unload at Supply Hub, return to the Ship. 
Table 6.   Route Descriptions 
The sorties or one completed flight mission per route per day for Routes 2 and 3 
are the same, with three sorties for each one.  Routes 1 and 4, with 6 and 2 sorties, 
respectively, differ because of the number of stops they need to make in order to finish 
their route.  In order to figure out how many sorties were available for each route, we 
made a few assumptions.  We assumed it took 30 minutes to load/refuel the helicopter, 30 
minutes to unload it, and 30 minutes to fly from any of the three locations to the other.   
  Through previous lessons learned, all helicopter flight operations performed were 
during the daylight.  We therefore assumed that there were only 720 minutes, or 12 hours, 
of flight time available each day.  The research team then divided the total sortie time 
into the flight time available to get the number of sorties each route can perform per day.  
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We assumed that an aircraft could perform its mission as long as it did not exceed 180 
minutes of flying time.  Table 7 describes the route types and the times for each one. 
 
Table 7.   Route Type and Flight Time 
Each route capacity is driven by the number of aircraft available multiplied by 
MCW or PAX, multiplied by sorties available per route for each T/M/S platform on that 
route.  For example, if there were two SH-60s and two MH-53Es assigned to Route 1 on 
day 2, the max capacity for that route would be (2*21,885 lbs. * 6) + (2 * 69,750 lbs. * 6) 
for a total route capacity of 1,099,620 pounds of water for D+2.  It is important to 
remember that the route capacity changes as the aircraft assigned to the route changes, 
due to the changing demands and priorities of the mission.  
6. Priority 
Since there is no clear-cut set of rules for establishing priority between, food, 
critical survival water, overall water, medical supplies, MEDEVACs, and displacements, 
the information we used to set the priorities for the model needed a baseline.  In order to 
accomplish this, multiplying mission capable aircraft by the percentage of aircraft 
devoted to that route was necessary.  All four routes in the model received 25% of each 
T/M/S available. 
The model transports food and medical supplies along the same route segment.  
Therefore, we needed to establish a priority of food relative to medical supplies. The 
priority for food demand calculation derives from using a percentage of the total volume 






















Route#1 Ship-LZ-Ship 30 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 60 120 6 720
Route#2 Ship-LZ-Hub-Ship 30 30 60 30 30 30 0 0 90 210 3
Route#3 Ship-Hub-LZ-Ship 30 30 30 30 60 30 0 0 90 210 3
Route#4 Ship-Hub-LZ-Hub-Ship 30 30 30 30 60 30 30 30 120 270 2
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supply demand of 4,611 pounds we added them and divided it by the food demand and 
discovered that the food demand was 99% of the combined total while the medical 
percentage was calculated as 1-99%=1%.   
It is important to remember that this demand changes on a daily basis.  In most 
cases, the percentage split gets smaller for medical supplies because of the demand 
dropping twice as fast as the food demand.  
 MEDEVACs and displaced people also share a route segment.  In this case, it is 
important to remember that delivering MEDEVACs takes full priority over delivering 
displaced personnel. 
7. Efficiency  
In this model, we analyzed the percentage of demand met across all six categories 
over the 14-day mission.  Simply stating that the model delivered 50,000,000 pounds of 
supplies may sound impressive; however, this number does not tell us if the model met 
total demand.  These models examine different ways to increase the total demand 
percentage, as well as the tradeoffs needed to accomplish this. 
C. RESPONSE A VERSUS RESPONSE B 
Every Carrier Air Wing (CVW) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) carries a 
slightly different number of T/M/S platforms on deployment.  Based on the research of 
previous HA/DR missions, we chose to model the most conservative combination of 
aircraft attached to a CSG and ARG. We initially chose to model two possible responses.  
The first model, considered the traditional model, consist of the old CSG and ARG 
aircraft make up that has one H-60 squadron in the CVW and the CH-46 is assigned to 
the MEU.   The second model, considered the new version, is slightly different with the 
CVW having two H-60 squadrons and the MV-22 replacing the CH-46 in the MEU.  The 
two responses titled Model 1 Response A, considered the traditional model, and Model 2 
Response B, considered the new model, were used to demonstrate two different CSG and 
ARG designs. 
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In Response A, the CSG had 15 SH-60 helicopters attached, seven attached to the 
aircraft carrier and eight more embarked on the destroyer squadron and supply ships in 
the strike group (U.S. Navy, 2011).  The ARG traditionally has nine CH-46s and four 
CH-53s attached to the LHD, as well as six SH/MH60 helicopters embarked on the Dock 
Landing Ship LSD and LPD ships. In addition, in Response A of the model, there were 
six SH60 helicopters embarked on two destroyers and a cruiser ordered onto the scene.  
In this response, the total aircraft on scene by day 14 was 27 H-60s, eight MH-53s, four 
CH-53s and nine CH-46 helicopters.  The H-60 arrival was 13 on day 2, 2 on day 3, 7 on 
day 7 and 2 each on days 9 and 10.  The MH-53s arrive on day 2 while the CH-53s and 
CH-46s did not arrive until day7.   
Response B was set up with the new composition of aircraft that the U.S. Navy 
and Marine Corps are working towards using.  The CSG now has 19 SH60 helicopters 
attached to the CAG, which is an increase of four SH-60 helicopters in the CSG.  The 
helicopters are now a part of the CAG and, depending on the composition of the 
destroyer squadron, a detachment of helicopters may embark on their ships.  This ensures 
that the CAG has a direct say as to a mission’s priority and the best use of the carrier air 
group’s resources.  The ARG now has 10 MV-22 aircraft attached to the ARG instead of 
the CH-46.  There are still four CH53s and six MH/SH60 helicopters embarked on the 
LSD and LPD.  The total aircraft on scene by day 8, in this response, was 31 H-60s, 8 
MH-53s, four CH53s, and 10 MV-22 aircraft.  The H-60 arrival was 17 on day 2, 2 on 
day 3, and 2 each on days7, 8, 9 and 10.  The MH-53s arrive on day 2 while the CH-53s 
and MV-22s did not arrive until day 7.   
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V. MODEL 1: ANALYSIS RESPONSE A VERSUS RESPONSE B 
In this chapter, we examine Model 1 results between Response A and Response 
B.  We decided to use the total percentage, total pounds, and total passengers delivered in 
order to give the best description of the model’s results.  The total percentage of demand 
delivered for each of the six categories shows the demands that the model did and did not 
meet.  This chapter explains why the model did not meet those demands and some 
possible changes we could make to the model in order to reduce the overall unmet 
demand.  The total pounds and passengers delivered describe exactly how much demand 
each model delivered when comparing Response A and Response B models to each 
other.  When the volume of water demand is high, delivering 1% more or less over the 
mission may not explain the difference as well as showing that the model delivered one 
million more or less pounds of water over that same mission. 
A. RESPONSE A 
1. Results 
The Response A model did not meet the critical survival water needs on any day 
over the 14-day mission.  The total critical survival water shortage gradually declined 
from 4,858,320 on day 2 to 3,149,610 by day 14.  Therefore in this case, the model met 
only 28% of the critical survival water demand over the 14-day mission.  The model 
never met overall water demand (which includes critical survival water demand) and the 
unmet demand gradually decreased from 28,378,000 pounds on day 2 to 22,435,000 
pounds by day 14.  The model did however meet 100% of the food demand by the end of 
day 2. 
The model met all medical supply demand by the end of day 2.  In this response, 
we had three people remaining from day 2, so in reference to MEDEVAC, the model 
delivered everyone who needed immediate medical attention by the end of the first flight 
on day 3.Displaced:  There was a total transfer of 7,168 displaced people to safety over 
the 14-day mission. 
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Table 8 gives a breakdown of the total percentage of demand met for the six 
categories as well as a breakdown of the total passengers and pounds delivered over the 
14-day mission period.  This model delivered a total of 25,526,493 pounds of food, water 
and medical supplies as well as 8,743 passengers to safety. 
 
 
Table 8.   Response A Timeframe Breakdown 
2. Analysis 
Aircraft utilization for the model is 100% for delivering water, MEDEVAC and 
displacements.  With the 25% distribution of aircraft, the model meets food demand 
every day with capacity to spare.  Day 2 through 14 had excess aircraft utilization that 
gradually grew from 12% on day 2 to 59% by day 14 of spare capacity.  Under the 10% 
mission degradation, all T/M/S felt the effects of the degradation.  Table 9 explains how 
each T/M/S was affected and when the affect occurred.  We cover the effects of the 
degradation on lost capacity in Table 10. 
 























Critical Survival Water 5,502,330 28,518,000 0.19 14,032,260 41,042,400 0.34 19,534,590 69,560,400 0.28
Water 5,502,330 142,590,000 0.04 14,032,260 205,210,000 0.07 19,534,590 347,802,000 0.06
Food 2,444,400 2,444,400 1.00 3,517,920 3,517,920 1.00 5,962,320 5,962,320 1.00
Medical Supplies 13,489 13,489 1.00 16,094 16,094 1.00 29,583 29,583 1.00
MEDEVAC 378 378 1.00 0 0 0.00 378 378 1.00





























SH-60 0.68 13 8 0.61 22 13 15 2 0.55 27 14 18 4
MH-53E 0.50 8 4 0.45 8 4 4 0 0.41 8 3 4 1
CH-46 0.00 0 0 0.75 9 6 0 0 0.67 9 6 7 1
CH-53E 0.00 0 0 0.75 4 3 0 0 0.68 4 2 3 1
Effects of 10% Degradation
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Response A is a simple baseline model that shows poor aircraft utilization and 
maintenance capability percentages.  By not using the available aircraft 100% of the time 
and not accounting for specific maintenance associated with the increased flight hours, 
this model lost opportunities to meet the critical survival water, overall water, and 
displacement demands.   
The lost operational aircraft data in Table 10 shows how many aircraft were lost 
over the 14-day mission for each T/M/S platform due to the 10% mission capability 
degradation.  By multiplying those lost aircraft by the number of sorties they fly per day, 






SH-60 D7 - D11 1 656,550  
 
D12 - D14 4 393,930  
   
1,050,480  
MH-53 D7 - D11 0 0 
 
D12 - D14 1 1,255,500  
   
1,255,500  
CH-46 D12 - D14 0 0  
CH-53 D12 - D14 1 1,323,000  
  
Total  3,628,980  
Table 10.   Response A Lost Capacity 
The overall percentage of demand met over this mission shows that this model 
only meets 28% of its critical water, 6% of its overall water, and 1.7% of the 
displacement demand.  By not establishing a priority system that would maximize the 
mission’s operational available aircraft and taking steps to maintain MC%, this model 
would require other responding organizations to pick up the remaining 72% of the critical 
water survival, 94% overall water, and 98.3% displacement demands. 
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B. RESPONSE B 
1. Results 
The Response B model did not meet critical survival water on any day over the 
14-day mission.  The total critical survival water demand gradually declined from 
4,700,000 pounds on day 2 to 2,600,000 pounds by day 14.  This meant that model was 
able to meet 35% of the critical survival water demand over the 14-day mission.  The 
model was also not able to meet the overall water demand during the 14-day mission.  It 
gradually decreased the unmet demand from 28,200,000 pounds on day 2 to 21,900,000 
pounds by day 14.  In the case of overall water demand, the model met 7% of the demand 
over the mission.  There was the 100% delivery of food for every day of the mission. 
The delivery of medical supplies for every day of the mission was 100%.  The 
model was able to deliver all 378 MEDEVAC personnel who needed immediate medical 
attention on the first day of flight operations.  The response was able to transport 8,793 
displaced personnel. 
Table 11 gives a breakdown of the total percentage of demand met for the six 
categories.  The table also breaks down the total passengers and pounds delivered over 
the 14-day period mission.  The model was able to deliver a total of 38,821,204 pounds to 
the landing zone and 9,171 passengers to safety. 
 

























Critical Survival Water 6,043,984 28,518,000 0.21 18,283,444 41,042,400 0.45 24,327,428 69,560,400 0.35
Water 6,043,984 142,590,000 0.04 24,327,428 347,802,000 0.07 24,327,428 347,802,000 0.07
Food 2,444,400 2,444,400 1.00 5,962,320 5,962,320 1.00 5,962,320 5,962,320 1.00
Medical Supplies 13,489 13,489 1.00 29,583 29,583 1.00 29,583 29,583 1.00
MEDEVAC 378 378 1.00 0 0 0.00 378 378 1.00







Aircraft utilization is 100% for delivering water, MEDEVAC and displacements.  
The 25% distribution of aircraft allowed the model to meet food demand every day with 
capacity to spare.  Day 2 through 14 had excess aircraft capacity on Route 3 that ranged 
from 23% on day 2 to 67% by day 14 of spare capacity.  Table 12 describes the effects all 
of the T/M/S felt under the 10% mission degradation over five fly days. 
 
Table 12.   Mission Affectability on Aircraft 
Response B is a simple baseline model with six additional SH-60 aircraft.  These 
additional aircraft increased the overall percentage of demand met; however, this model 
still shows poor aircraft utilization percentages and maintenance capabilities.  By not 
using the available aircraft 100% of the time and not accounting for specific maintenance 
associated with the increased flight hours, this model lost opportunities to meet the 
critical water survival, overall water, and displacement demands.  The lost operational 
aircraft available from Table 13 shows how many aircraft from each T/M/S platform the 
10% mission capability degradation affected.  When you multiply those lost aircraft by 
the number of sorties they fly per day, by their MCW, the total lost capacity is 4,618,980 






























SH-60 0.68 17 11 0.61 25 15 17 2 0.55 31 17 21 4
MV-22 0.00 0 0 0.67 10 6 0 0 6.00 10 6 7 1
MH-53E 0.50 8 4 0.45 8 3 4 1 0.41 8 3 4 1







SH-60 D7 - D11 1 656,550  
 
D12 - D14 4 393,930  
   
1,050,480  
MH-53 D7 - D11 0 0 
 
D12 - D14 1 1,255,500  
   
1,255,500  
CH-46 D12 - D14 1 990,000  
CH-53 D12 - D14 1 1,323,000  
  
Total  4,618,980  
Table 13.   Response B Lost Capacity 
The overall percentage of demand met over this mission shows that this model 
only met 35% of its critical survival water, 7% of its overall water, and 2% of the 
displacement demand.  By not establishing a priority system to maximize the aircraft 
available and not taking steps to maintain or increase MC%, this model would require 
some other organization to pick up the remaining 30% of the critical water survival, 86% 
overall water, and 98% displacement demands. 
C. COMPARING RESPONSE A TO RESPONSE B 
When comparing the six categories from both responses, both Response A and 
Response B deliver 100% of demand each day for MEDEVAC, food, and medical 
supplies.  The difference between the two responses became evident when analyzing the 
amount of critical survival water and overall water demand delivered in Response B.  
During Response B, the model was able to meet 35% of the critical water survival 
demand, compared to only 28% from Response A.  The difference between the two 
models is 4,792,838 pounds, or 7% more critical water delivered by Response B.  
However, the overall water delivered only went up from 6% in Response A to 7% in 
Response B.  With the overall high volume of water demand, the 4,792,838 pounds 
increase in critical survival water delivered only resulted in a 1% increase in the overall 
water demand met.  
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1. Lost Capacity 
 Although there were additional aircraft on scene in Response B, the 10% 
mission capability degradation still negatively affected aircraft availability.  This 
degradation decreased the total amount of operational aircraft available and increased the 
total lost capacity from Response A to Response B by 1,110,000 pounds.  This meant that 
it was possible to deliver an additional 1,110,000 pounds of critical survival water if we 
could maintain the same mission capability percentages that we had when the T/M/S 
platforms arrived. 
2. Aircraft Utilization 
Adding additional aircraft to Response B increased the aircrafts’ spare capacity 
assigned to Routes 3 and 4 (the food and medical supply routes).   Although an increase 
in the capacity is a good thing, when the spare capacity increases by 11% in a HA/DR 
mission and there is still unmet demand somewhere else, it means that more aircraft sit on 
the flight deck instead of helping to meet the required demands. This additional spare 
capacity would get more use on Routes 1 and 2, where critical survival water, overall 
water, and displacement demands have not already been met. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this baseline model, it is clear that Response B, with the additional aircraft, is 
the better model.  Response B’s percentage of demand met was higher in all six 
categories and ended up delivering 4,792,838 pounds more of rescue supplies to the 
landing zone and 1,625 more passengers to safety. 
Nevertheless, the same problems underlie both responses.  Having too much spare 
capacity on some routes and not enough capacity on others leads to wasted opportunities.  
These wasted opportunities translate into real people suffering every day until we meet 
that demand. 
In an effort to increase our capacity to deliver supplies and passengers, we 
analyzed the value of each route, considering how much each route delivered and 
comparing them to each other.   We did this by assigning two SH-60s to each route and 
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multiplied the MCW by the number of sorties each route could complete.  To account for 
the transportation of passengers we assumed that 10 MEDEVAC or displaced people 
equaled 21,885 pounds.  From our model, it was clear that Route 4 delivered the least 
value because it did not add any value on two of its legs (ship–hub and LZ–ship) and 
flight time constraints allowed only two sorties a day per aircraft.  Therefore, we decided 
to investigate the question, “What would be the results if we eliminated Route 4 and 
established different models based on a priority system that would maximize the 
operational aircraft and minimize the spare aircraft capacity per route?”  We addressed 
this question through additional models described in the next chapter.   Table 14 
describes the best route value. 
 








6 3 3 2
Ship-Lz(Water) 21,885 Ship-LZ(Water) 21,885 Ship-Hub(nothing) 0 Ship-Hub(Nothing) 0
Lz-Ship(Nothing) 0 LZ-hub(pax) 21,885 Hub-LZ(Food/supply) 21,885 Hub-LZ(food/supply) 21,885
Hub-ship(nothing) 0 LZ-Ship(nothing) 0 LZ-Hub(Pax) 21,885
Hub-Ship 0
Total (2 AC each 
route) 131,310 131,310 65,655 87,540
Assume 8 AC Total





VI. ALLOCATION OF HELICOPTERS TO ROUTES 
After analyzing Model 1’s Response A and Response B, we identified two areas 
that were constraining the model’s potential: a poor aircraft utilization rate on Route 3, 
and only providing two sorties a day on Route 4.  Both constrained the model and 
affected its ability to meet demand.   In this chapter, we focus on these issues by 
eliminating Route 4 and setting aircraft priorities to maximize each available aircraft’s 
utilization rate. 
A. MODEL 2: HEURISTIC APPROACH 
 The emphasis of this model was equal distribution of whole aircraft across all 
three routes to assess the effect of eliminating Route 4.  For example, if there were seven 
SH-60s available, two aircraft would first go to Route 1, the next two aircraft would go to 
Route 2, and finally, two aircraft would go to Route 3.  With one aircraft left over and the 
priority given to Route 1, the last aircraft’s assignment is to Route 1. 
This model operates on the assumption that there is no given set of priorities on 
the six categories of demand or which T/M/S platform to use as a delivery method.  
Based on Model 1’s Response A versus Response B analysis, we wanted to identify if the 
total pounds and passengers delivered would increase if Route 4 was eliminated and  
those aircraft moved to Routes 1, 2, and 3.   
The results show the importance of identifying the capacity of each route.  Those 
routes with the most capacity should be used to deliver as much of the required demand 
as possible, and those routes that do a little of everything less efficiently should be 
eliminated.  These eliminated routes may provide a specialty that could be more 
beneficial later in the mission.  However, in the first 14 days of a mission on the routes 
that deliver the most rescue supplies, it is critical to maximize all available aircraft to 
ensure the meeting of MEDEVAC demand as quickly as possible. 
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1. Category Results 
The model never met critical survival water demand and only delivered 72% of 
the critical survival water demand over the 14 days.  The unmet critical survival water 
demand gradually dropped from 4,000,000 pounds on Day 2 to 1,600,000 pounds on Day 
14.  The model also never met the overall water demand. The overall capacity increased 
with the arrival of the ARG on day 7, which allowed it to meet 10% of the overall 
demand.  It was also able to meet 12% of the demand on day 7 through 14 when the CSG 
and ARG were working together delivering water.  The overall unmet water demand 
gradually decreased from 27,600,000 pounds on the first day of operations to 21,000,000 
pounds on the last day. 
Daily food demand was met not until day 6.  The CSG alone did not have enough 
aircraft available to meet this demand.  On day 7, the model meets food demand very 
quickly with the arrival of the ARG and the falling daily demand.  This led to excess 
capacity on Route 3 for the next eight days of the mission. 
With an overall demand of 378 people who needed a MEDEVAC, the model was 
able to deliver 285 people on the first day of operations (day2).  Delivery of the 
remaining people occurred on day 3.  This model shows a capacity to meet demand with 
the initial CSG response.  Daily medical supply demand was not met until day 6.  The 
CSG alone did not have enough aircraft available to meet this demand.  On day 7, the 
model was able to meet food demand with the arrival of the ARG.  This led to excess 
capacity on Route 3 for the next eight days of the mission.  The model never met 
displaced demand, although it did gradually decrease from 420,000 people to 413,781 
people. 
2. Model Analysis  
There was 100% aircraft utilization on Routes 1 and 2, but Route 3 still had 
excess capacity.  The excess capacity started on day 6 (1%) and gradually increased until 
day 14 (56%).  This wasted capacity would get better utilization on other routes that still 
have unmet demand. 
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The heuristic model delivers 10,274,492 more pounds of supplies and 2,859 less 
passengers than the baseline 25% Response B model.  This model showed that focusing 
on the routes that deliver the most demand by cutting out the routes that were less 
efficient increased the overall percentage of demand met for five of the six categories.  
The tradeoff in this model was a lower number of displacements transported with an 
increase in the total pounds delivered and meeting the MEDEVAC demand one day 
sooner.  This model fully utilized its aircraft until day 6 whereas the baseline model had 
excess capacity starting at day 2.  Table 15 gives a breakdown of the heuristic model 
results. 
 
Table 15.   Heuristic Distribution  
B. MODEL 3 PRIORITY 
In this model, we prioritized demand categories and based the assignment of 
aircraft on these priorities in an attempt to better utilize capacity.  The design of the 
model was to meet the demand for current priority before fulfilling the demand of the 
next lower priority.  This model also gave priority to the aircrafts with the highest 
MCW/PAX capability to fulfill the given priority.  Route 1 was used over Route 2 for the 
delivery of critical survival water because of the higher number of sorties it had available 
to meet the critical survival water demand.  Aircraft assignment was based on the aircraft 
that were available that have the highest MCW or PAX capability, depending on which 




























Critical Survival Water 9,379,800 28,518,000 0.33 25,336,320 41,042,400 1.00 34,716,120 69,560,400 0.72
Water 9,379,800 142,590,000 0.07 25,336,320 205,212,000 0.12 34,716,120 347,802,000 0.10
Food 2,330,199 2,444,400 0.95 3,517,920 3,517,920 1.00 5,848,119 5,962,320 0.98
Medical Supplies 13,489 11,321 1.19 16,094 29,583 0.54 29,583 29,583 1.00
MEDEVAC 378 378 1.00 0 0 0.00 378 378 1.00






• Critical survival water—Routes 1 & 2 (lbs.) – 6 sorties/day 
• MEDEVAC— Route 2 (PAX) – 3 sorties/day 
• Food/medical supplies— Route 3 (lbs.) – 3 sorties/day 
• Overall water— Routes 1 & 2 (lbs.) – 6 sorties/day 
• Displaced—Route2 (PAX) – 3 sorties/day 
For example, since priority one is critical survival water (Route 1 [lbs.]), the 
model would use the MH-53E because it has a higher MCW than the SH-60.  The model 
used the minimal amount of each T/M/S platform needed to meet demand.  The 
remaining aircraft assignments were to the next priority (MEDEVAC) until fulfilling all 
demand. 
This model, as well as all subsequent models, use Response B as their baseline.  
Setting different priorities changed the overall demand met so we set meeting priority 
demands in the following order, from highest to lowest: critical survival water, 
MEDEVAC, overall water, food, medical, and finally, displaced people.  What we 
learned was that by setting certain demands as higher priorities directly affected the 
percentage of demand met in other categories.  An example would be making it a priority 
to deliver critical survival water before meeting any other demand, which may affect how 
quickly meeting the MEDEVAC demand occurs.  With limited resources, the models in 
this chapter show how to increase the total pounds of rescue supplies delivered and 
ensure the transfer of all MEDEVAV/displaced personnel as soon as possible. 
1. Aircraft Assignment 
Unlike the prior models, this model has changing aircraft-to-route assignments 
over the response days as needed to meet demand in the order of priority. When the CSG 
arrived on day 2 it had the MH-53E and SH-60 to choose from.  We assigned all 
available aircraft to route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand. Since the 
available aircraft could not meet this demand, the assignment of aircraft did not change 
until day 7 when the ARG arrived. On day 7, we reassessed the aircraft assignments to 
account for the additional aircraft and their capabilities to fulfill the required demand.  
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With these additional aircraft on scene and the 10% mission capability degradation 
starting to affect the model, we assigned all available MH-53Es, CH-53Es and MV-22 to 
Route 1.   With only the SH-60 left to assign we assigned the available 6.75 SH-60s to 
Route 1 fill the rest of the critical survival water demand.  We then assigned the 
remaining 8.25 SH-60s to route 2 to fulfill the MEDEVAC demand.  By the end of day 7, 
the model met all daily critical survival water but there was still a need for the transport 
of 131 MEDEVACs.  On day 8 because of the displacement percentage drop, we 
reallocated .50 of a SH-60 from route 1 and 3.75 SH-60s from Route 2 to start fulfilling 
the food and medical supply demand on Route 3.  By the end of day 8 the model fulfilled 
the critical survival water and MEDEVAC demand and SH-60s had begun delivering 
food and medical supplies to Route 3.  From day 9 through 14, we reassigned the SH-60s 
from Route 3 to Route 1 in order to help fulfill the overall water demand.  We were able 
to do this because the displacement percentage drop decreased the daily demand for food 
enough to redistribute aircraft as needed. 
Since this model was never able to fulfill the overall water demand, it was never 
able to dedicate any resources to transporting the displaced.  This model shows how 
using priorities and best available capabilities can significantly increase the total pounds 
delivered while meeting the critical survival water by day 7 and the MEDEVAC demand 
by day 8.  The downside to this model is that the delivery of any food or medical supplies 
was not until day 8 and meeting daily demand was not until day 9.  This model 
accomplished our goal of increasing the total pounds delivered and fulfilling the daily 
demands faster than the heuristic approach in Model 2. 
2. Category Results 
This model uses 99.4% of the aircraft that were available.  With these available 
aircraft, the model was able to deliver 89% of the critical survival water demand.  
MEDEVAC was the second priority and the response filled 100% of the demand by day 
7.  The filling of food and medical supplies, which was the third and fourth daily priority, 
was not until day 9 after the ARG arrived on scene and provided additional capacity to 
meet demand.  Overall water was the fifth priority and the model never met demand 
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during this mission.  The response did however deliver 22% between days 7 and 14 when 
the entire HA/DR team was on scene and 18% of the overall water demand during the 14 
day mission.  The model only delivered 4 displaced personnel because the overall water 
demand was so high and transporting the displaced was our last priority in this model. 
3. Model Analysis 
This model demonstrated that by assigning priorities and using the T/M/S 
platform available with the highest MCW or PAX capability, it could deliver 23,000,000 
more pounds of rescue supplies than the heuristic model.  When comparing the total 
pounds delivered by category, the data indicated a 10% advantage in aircraft utilization, 
15% more critical survival water, and 14% more overall water demand satisfied than the 
heuristic model.  This model fulfilled 100% of the MEDEVAC and medical supply 
demand. 
In order to fulfill MEDEVACs and critical survival water demands first, this 
model fulfilled 49% less of the food demand.  This model showed that having priorities 
and rules to distribute the available T/M/S platforms increased the aircraft utilization and 
overall percentage of rescue supplies delivered, but sacrificed the timely delivery of food, 
medical supplies and MEDEVACs.  Table 16 gives the results of the priority model. 
 



























Critical Survival Water 16,117,290 28,518,000 0.57 45,994,489 41,042,400 1.12 62,111,779 69,560,400 0.89
Water 16,117,290 142,590,000 0.11 45,994,489 205,212,000 0.22 62,111,779 347,802,000 0.18
Food 0 2,444,400 0.00 3,517,920 3,517,920 1.00 2,936,199 5,962,320 0.49
Medical Supplies 0 13,489 0.00 27,565 27,565 1.00 45,734 41,054 1.11
MEDEVAC 0 378 0.00 0 0 0.00 378 378 1.00






C. MODEL 4 COST PER HOUR (CPH) 
With the CPH model, we addressed the cost benefit analysis of assigning aircraft 
to the routes that best matched those platforms’ strengths and assessed whether that 
fulfilled a higher percentage of demand across our six categories.  We took the individual 
cost per flight hour for each T/M/S platform and divided it by the MCW and PAX 
capabilities.  This gave us the cost of moving one pound of weight per flight hour and the 
cost of transporting one passenger on each T/M/S platform.  Based on these costs, the 
aircraft assignments were to those routes that provided the best value until they met the 
daily demand.  Once we fulfilled that demand, that specific platform assignment was to 
the next task it does best. 
By looking at Table 17, it is easy to tell that the MV-22 and MH-53E are more 
cost effective in every area, when compared to the SH-60 and CH-53E.  The confusion 
comes when asking the question; how much better or worse is a specific platform at 
delivering one demand over the other?  We used the MV-22 as the baseline for the most 
efficient delivery method.  The team then divided the MV-22 cost per pounds and PAX 
by each individual T/M/S platform cost per pounds and PAX to give an efficiency 
comparison among the four T/M/S platforms.  From these calculations, we determined 
that one platform is clearly more cost effective at delivering certain categories. 
 
 
Table 17.   Efficiency Hierarchy for lbs./PAX 
1. Assigning Aircrafts 
We still decided to use the same priority system only when deciding if it should 
allocate resources between Routes 1, 2 and 3.  For example, if an aircraft had a higher 
efficiency in delivering pounds rather than PAX, the aircraft assignment was to the route 











MV-22 $6,600 55,000  24 $0.12 1 $275.00 1 2.00 1st
MH-53E $11,275 73,500  37 $0.15 0.78 $304.73 0.90 1.68 2nd
SH-60 $3,995 21,885  10 $0.18 0.66 $399.50 0.69 1.35 3rd
CH-53E $12,100 42,000  38 $0.29 0.42 $318.42 0.86 1.28 4th
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that fulfilled the highest priority.  If we did not meet the critical water demand, then the 
aircraft went to Route 1, but if we fulfilled the critical survival water, the aircraft 
assignment went to fulfilling the food and medical supply demand, the overall water 
demand, and finally, the displacement demand. 
When deciding the assignment of aircraft to Route 2, we added both efficiency 
categories (since Route 2 delivers both poundage [water] and PAX [MEDEVAC and 
displaced]) and assigned the T/M/S platform with the highest combined percentage.  
After fulfilling the MEDEVAC demand, the T/M/S platform assigned to Route 2 
continued to deliver the displaced personnel until another platform arrived on scene with 
higher cost efficiency. 
On day 2, the only two T/M/S platforms to choose from were the MH-53E and 
SH-60.  The MH-53E PAX efficiency is higher than its pound efficiency so it was 
assigned to Route 2.  The SH-60s have higher pounds efficiency so their assignment went 
to Route 1.  Since the model never meets critical survival water demand and no other 
aircraft arrived on scene, this distribution of aircraft remained the same until D+7 when 
the ARG arrived with additional aircraft. 
On day 7, with the arrival of the ARG, we needed to reallocate resources to best 
use the available T/M/S aircrafts.  The arrival of the MV-22 changed which aircraft had 
the highest efficiency in delivering the critical survival water.  However, since the MV-
22 also had the highest PAX efficiency, the question became, how much better is the 
MV-22 than the next highest platform?  The MV-22 was 22% more efficient than the 
MH-53E in delivering poundage and 10% more efficient in delivering PAX.  Based on 
this information, we assigned the MV-22 to Route 1 in order to fulfill the critical survival 
water demand.  Since the MH-53E is the next best platform in both categories, we needed 
to determine how much better it was.  Since the MH-53Es had a higher PAX efficiency 
rating, their assignment was to Route 2. 
When comparing the SH-60 to the CH-53E, the data showed that the CH-53E is 
17% more efficient than the SH-60 at delivering poundage.  With this information, we 
then assigned three CH-53Es to Route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand.  
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With only the SH-60 available, we assigned 11.5 SH-60s to fulfill the critical survival 
water demand.  We then assigned the remaining 3.5 SH-60s to Route 3 to fulfill food and 
medical supply demand. 
On days 8 through 11, the displaced percentage gradually drops, which decreases 
the demand for critical survival water, food, medical supplies and overall water demand.  
As the demand drops for critical survival water, it allows us to redistribute the SH-60s to 
Route 3 to fulfill the food/medical supply demand.  Once we meet the food and medical 
supply demand, we redistributed that extra aircraft capacity back to Route 1 to help fulfill 
the overall water demand. 
On days 12 through 14, the mission capability degradation decreased the overall 
CH-53Es and SH-60s available by one aircraft each.  This led us to assigning 11.5 SH-
60s to Route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand and 5.5 to food and medical 
supply demand (Route 3) and zero to meet the overall water demand (Route1).   
2. Category Results 
The model used 99% of its available aircraft.  Realizing the effects of the 
degradation did not occur until days 7 and 12, in which the impacts reduced the overall 
aircraft available.  The model was still able to deliver 73% of the overall critical survival 
water demand, but this was not until day 7.  Filling the second priority was on the first 
day of flight operations with the delivery (on day 2) of all 378 MEDEVACs.  This model 
transported 6,882 displaced personnel, which was 2% of the overall demand.  The model 
never met overall water demand during this mission.  However it did deliver 20 % 
between day 7 through 14 when the entire HA/DR team was on scene and 15% of the 
overall water demand during the 14 day mission.  Meeting 100% of food and medical 
supply demand was only on met days 10, 11 and 14.  Mission degradation caused the 
model to miss meeting the demand on days 12 and 13.  This model did however, deliver 
51% of the overall food demand and 43% of the medical supply demand. 
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3. Model Analysis 
This model’s choice to allow the MH-53E to keep delivering the displaced instead 
of redistributing the aircraft to fulfill other demands showed the potential of how many 
displaced can be transported by dedicating a platform to what it does best.  The ability to 
assign aircraft by the highest efficiency gave this model the ability to provide the most 
cost-effective solution.  This model delivered 8,850,000 pounds less than the priority-
driven Model 3, while taking five days longer to meet critical water demand.  However, it 
did deliver 6,878 more displaced personnel, had a 1% aircraft utilization advantage, and 
was five days faster delivering the MEDEVAC personnel.  The effects of mission 
degradation disrupted the models ability to fulfill the food/medical supply demand.  
Table 18 describes this information.  
 
Table 18.   CPH Description 
This model’s true advantage would come into play when demands are small 
enough to perform with less aircraft.  When this happens, it would be necessary to make a 
decision as to which T/M/S platforms would continue the mission and which ones would 
leave.  Based on the current demands and priorities, leadership could make a qualified 
decision that best supported the mission, while minimizing the overall costs. 
D. MODEL 5 CPH (2) 
Based on Model 4 (CPH) we wanted to model what would happen if we used the 



























Critical Survival Water 11,932,290 28,518,000 0.42 41,612,625 41,042,400 1.01 53,150,985 34,780,200 1.52
Water 11,932,290 142,590,000 0.08 41,612,625 204,212,000 0.20 53,150,985 346,802,000 0.15
Food 0 2,444,400 0.00 3,041,033 3,517,920 0.86 3,041,033 5,962,320 0.51
Medical Supplies 0 13,489 0.00 44,631 90,055 0.50 44,631 103,544 0.43
MEDEVAC 378 378 1.00 0 0 0.00 378 378 1.00






redistribute the aircraft on Route 2, once MEDEVAC demand was met, to the next 
highest demand that needed fulfilling.  This allowed a CPH-based model that was more 
comparable to the priorities model (Model 3). 
1. Assigning Aircrafts 
On day 2, the model only required 2.5 MH-53Es to fulfill the MEDEVAC 
demand on Route 2.  The remaining 1.5 MH-53E and all SH-60 assignments went to 
Route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand. 
On day 3, we met MEDEVAC demand and redistributed the MH-53Es to Route 1 
along with the SH-60s to help fulfill the critical survival water demand.  Since the model 
never met critical survival water demand, the assignment of aircraft remained the same 
until Day 7.  During days 8 through 11, the displaced percentage dropped the overall food 
and medical supply demand enough to redistribute the SH-60s from Route 3 to Route 1 in 
order to fulfill the overall water demand. 
On day 7, with the arrival of the ARG, we redistributed the resources based on the 
new efficiency hierarchy.  The arrival of the MV-22 changed which aircraft had the 
highest efficiency in delivering the critical survival water so we assigned all MV-22s to 
Route 1.  Since there was no MEDEVAC demand, we assigned all four MH-53Es and 
three CH-53Es to Route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand.  We then assigned 
6.75 SH-60s to complete the critical survival water demand, and distributed 7.5 SH-60s 
to fulfill the food and medical supply demand.  We then assigned the remaining .75 of the 
SH-60’s capacity back to Route 1 to help fulfill the overall water demand.  This was also 
the first day that the 10% mission capability degradation affected the T/M/S platforms on 
scene and reduced the total number of aircraft available. 
During days 12 through 14, the model suffered another 10% MC drop that 
reduced the total number of CH-53E and SH-60s available on scene by one each.  This 
reduction in aircraft forced us to use more SH-60s to fill the critical survival water 
demand instead of using those resources to fill the next priority. 
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2. Category Results 
Mission degradation did not affect the model until days 7 and 12, but the model 
still was able to use 99.4% of its aircraft available.  The model delivered 88% of the 
overall critical survival water demand on day 3.  The model never met the overall water 
demand during this mission.  However, the model did deliver 22 % between days 7 
through 14 when the entire HA/DR team was on scene, and 18% of the overall water 
demand during the 14 day mission.  The delivery of all 378 MEDEVACs occurred on the 
first day of flight operations but only delivered 34 of the displaced personnel.  The model 
did not fill food and medical supply until day 7.  When the ARG arrived on scene, the 
extra capacity allowed the model to fill 59% of the food demand and 69% of the medical 
demand. 
3. Model Analysis 
This model delivered 70,000 pounds less of supplies and 30 more displaced 
personnel, held a 1.4% aircraft utilization advantage, delivered MEDEVACs six days 
faster, and food and medical supply demand two days faster.   This equals 10% more 
food and 19% more medical supplies delivered when compared to the priorities model.  
This model also met the critical survival water demand on the same day as the priority 
model (Day 7).  However, it delivered 1% less critical survival water and the same 18% 
of the overall water demand over the 14-day mission.  Overall, this model delivers 1% 
less critical survival water, but gains advantages in four other categories.  If the 
leadership is willing to sacrifice that 1% of the critical survival water, they meet a greater 
percentage in overall demand of the other five categories. The ability to choose platforms 
that provide the best cost effectiveness ultimately ensures that each aircraft is delivering 
what it should.  Table 19 gives a breakdown of the CPH (2) model results. 
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Table 19.   CPH (2) Description 
E. MODEL 6 TIMELINE COMPARISON (ARG VS. CSG) 
There is a debate in the Navy over which support platform is more beneficial.  Is 
the CSG more useful in a HA/DR mission over the ARG?  We modeled the overall 
percentage of demand fulfilled in the six categories.  This model used the same rules and 
assumptions as Model 5 (CPH2).  To set up the model, we changed the number of aircraft 
available by having the ARG arriving first on day 2 and the CSG arriving on day 7.  
1. Assigning Aircraft 
On day 2, the model had three platforms to choose from, which were the MV-22, 
SH-60, and CH-53-E.  The MV-22 has the highest efficiency under both passenger and 
poundage categories.  When comparing the MV-22 to the SH-60 and CH-53E, we 
discovered that the MV-22 was 14% better than the CH-53E delivering PAX and 34% 
better than the SH-60 with poundage delivery.  With this information, we assigned the 
MV-22 to Route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand.  The CH-53E’s highest 
efficiency is in delivering passengers, which is why we assigned 2.5 CH-53Es to fulfill 
the MEDEVAC demand and those remaining we assigned to Route 1 to help fill the 
critical survival water demand.  We assigned all available SH-60s to Route 1 to help 
fulfill the critical survival water demand. 
The model filled the day 3 MEDEVAC demand on day 2, which allowed 



























Critical Survival Water 15,594,165 28,518,000 0.55 45,485,663 41,042,400 1 61,079,828 34,780,200 0.00
Water 15,594,165 142,590,000 0.11 45,485,663 205,212,000 0.22 61,079,828 347,802,000 0.18
Food 800,611 2,444,400 0.33 3,515,553 3,517,920 1.00 3,515,553 5,962,320 0.59
Medical Supplies 3,663 13,489 0.27 29,583 29,594 1.00 29,583 43,083 0.69
MEDEVAC 378 378 1.00 0 0 0.00 378 378 1.00






shows that the CH-53E is 3% more efficient.  Therefore, we assigned the three available 
CH-53Es and four available Sh-60s to Route 1.  Since this model never met critical 
survival water demand, the distribution of aircraft remained the same until the CSG 
arrives on day 7. 
With the arrival of the CSG on day 7 it gave us additional aircraft and capabilities.  
The MV-22 was still the most cost efficient and was assigned to Route1.  The MH-53E 
was second in efficiency and assigned to route 1.  The SH-60 was third most efficient in 
delivering pounds so 13.75 Sh-60’s were assigned to Route 1 to fulfill the critical 
survival water demand.  The remaining SH-60’s were assigned to route 3 to help fulfill 
the food/medical demand.  We then assigned 1.25 CH-53E to fulfill the food/medical 
supply demand and allocated the remaining .75 CH-53E capacity to route 1 to help fulfill 
the overall water demand. 
During days 8 through 11, as the displacement percentage dropped, it allowed us 
to redistribute the CH-53Es from Route 3 to Route 1 as the SH-60s are redistributed from 
Route 1 to Route 3.  On day 12, the mission capability degradation reduced the number of 
MV-22, MH-53E and SH-60s available by one each.  This forced us to distribute an 
additional 4.75 SH-60s to Route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand.  This 
reduced the SH-60s on Route 3, which increased the required CH-53Es needed to fulfill 
the food and medical supply demand on route 3 and decreased the aircraft dedicated to 
fulfilling the overall water demand. 
2. Category Results 
Mission degradation did not affect the model until days 7 and 12 but the model 
still was able to use 97% of its aircraft available.  The model did not meet the critical 
survival water demand until Day 7.  The model never met the overall water demand 
during this mission.  The model filled 13% of the overall water demand by day 6 and 
18% of the overall water demand by day 14.  The delivery of all 378 MEDEVACs 
occurred on the first day of flight operations but only delivered 34 of the displaced 
personnel.  The model delivered 59% of the food and medical supply demand by day 14. 
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3. Model Analysis 
This model describes how over the first six days of the mission, the ARG out 
performs the CSG with the delivery of 4% more critical survival water,  This model 
delivers the same percentage of food/medical supplies and overall water as Model 
4(CPH2). Overall, this model shows how important the ARG resources are in fulfilling 
the demand as soon as possible.  Over the 14 days of this mission, this model delivered 
2,500,000, more pounds of rescue supplies than when the CSG arrived first.  Table 20 
displays this information. 
 
Table 20.   ARG vs. CSG Description 
F. MODEL 6 PERFECT UNION MODEL 
We analyzed the effects of getting the required resources on scene more quickly 
in this model.  This particular model only differed in that we used the assumption that the 
CSG and ARG could both arrive on scene at day 2 and immediately begin flight 
operations. The model achieves the best fulfillment percentage of demand in each of the 
six categories over the 14-day mission.  This model used the same priorities and rules to 
assign aircraft as Model 5 CPH (2).   
1. Assigning aircraft 
On day 2, there were four T/M/S platforms to choose from with 45 aircraft to 
distribute.  From the efficiency breakdown, we assigned the MV-22 to Route 1.  The 



























Critical Survival Water 19,141,200 28,518,000 0.67 45,285,919 41,042,400 1.10 64,427,119 69,560,400 1.00
Water 19,141,200 142,590,000 0.13 45,285,919 205,212,000 0.22 64,427,119 347,802,000 0.19
Food 0 2,444,400 0.00 3,051,720 3,517,920 0.87 3,051,720 5,962,320 0.51
Medical 0 13,489 0.00 29,583 45,205 0.65 29,583 58,694 0.50
MEDEVAC 0 378 0.00 378 378 0.00 378 378 1.00






efficiency in delivering PAX between the two aircraft.  Therefore, its assignment was to 
Route 2 in order to fulfill the MEDEVAC demand, with the remaining aircraft assigned 
to Route 1 to fulfill the critical survival water demand.  The SH-60s have the next highest 
poundage efficiency and we assigned them to Route 3.  The assignment of the remaining 
SH-60s was to Route 1 in order to fulfill the overall water demand.  The CH-53Es were 
last on the poundage efficiency and assigned to Route 1 in order to fulfill the overall 
water demand.  The model used these same steps for days 3 through 14. 
2. Model Results 
Mission degradation did not affect the model until days 7 and 12, but the model 
was still able to use 98% of its aircraft available.  The model delivered 100% of the 
overall critical survival water and MEDEVAC demand on the first day of flights.  The 
model never met overall water demand during this mission, but was able to fill 24% of 
the overall water demand.  It was able to meet the food and medical supply demand on 
day 2 and filled 93% and 100% of the demand respectively. 
3. Model Analysis 
This model demonstrates, based on our priorities and rules for assigning aircraft, 
that the most this response can deliver is 82,478,000 pounds of rescue supplies and 413 
PAX as described in Table 21.  The model did not meet overall water demand and none 
of the displacement demand, which meant outside organizations, would have to fulfill 
them. 
 



























Critical Survival Water 33,682,770 28,518,000 1.18 43,242,660 41,042,400 1.05 76,925,430 69,560,400 1.11
Water 33,682,770 142,590,000 0.24 43,242,660 205,212,000 0.21 76,925,430 347,802,000 0.22
Food 2,005,460 2,444,400 0.82 3,517,920 3,517,920 1.00 5,523,380 5,962,320 0.93
Medical Supplies 13,489 13,489 1.00 16,094 16,094 1.00 29,583 29,583 1.00
MEDEVAC 378 378 1.00 0 0 1.00 378 378 1.00






When comparing the total percentage of demand fulfilled between the first five 
days and the last seven days, we noticed that the last seven days had a smaller percentage 
of demand fulfilled.  After further analysis, the team attributed this loss in efficiency to 
the 10% MC degradation.  With all aircraft on scene at day 2, it ultimately caused each 
T/M/S platform to suffer two mission capability degradations.  Previous models only 
showed the SH-60 and MH-53E suffering two separate MC% degradations with the other 
T/M/S platforms only suffering one degradation.  These degradations across all the 









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 69 
VII. THE EFFECTS OF MAINTENANCE ON A HA/DR MISSION 
From previous lessons learned, we now know that the average aircraft flies three 
times more flight hours than it normally would during a catastrophic HA/DR mission.  
For example, a CH-53E on deployment normally flies around 30 hours during a 30-day 
timeframe.  If an HA/DR mission lasts 30 days, this would mean that the CH-53 would 
have to fly 90 hours in that 30-day timeframe.  The sudden increase in flight hours on the 
aircraft participating in the mission would place a strain on the local supply system of 
items not stocked.  In addition, the sudden increase in flight hours decreases the Ao of all 
platforms involved. 
Using the NAVAIR anchor desk customer support program via the NAVAIR 
website www.navair.navy.mil, we have identified the top 10 NMCS parts that could most 
likely cause the MC% to fall for U.S. Navy helicopters involved in these missions.  We 
believe that by identifying these top 10 items and using the Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF) for all items listed, we predicted how many of the parts will be needed to satisfy 
the first 14 days of a HA/DR mission. 
During the research process, we were unable to obtain all of the proper 
information from the Aviation Financial Analysis Tool (AFAST) to identify on average 
what exactly went wrong with each item of the top 10 list and the average cost to fix the 
items.  Since the only consistent cost information we were able to acquire for all 
platforms were the BCM cost, we decided to give a worst-case analysis on all platforms 
except the SH-60. The research team was unable to obtain the MTBF for the top 10 
maintenance failures for the SH-60.  Without the MTBFs, the research team was unable 
to predict how many failures would occur with the increased flight hours for this 
platform.  
A. MAINTENANCE FAILURES AND BCM COSTS 
The CH-53E can expect to need 27 additional parts spread over the top 10 for a 
BCM cost of $5,360,000.  This leads the pack with the least amount of maintenance 
failures and the lowest overall BCM costs.  The MV-22 comes in second with 146 
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expected maintenance failures and a BCM cost of $22,750,000.  The MH-53E comes in 
last with 178 top ten maintenance failures with a BCM cost of $30,780,000.  See 
Appendix for BCM break-down and expected failures for each T/M/S platform. 
The BCM costs show a worst-case total maintenance costs to fix the top 10 
NMCS maintenance issues. The expected failures is a very realistic possibility that the 
carrier air group maintenance officer (CAGMO), ship supply officer (SUPPO) and 
respective wing readiness officer (WRO) need to account for and identify how and when 
these assets will be delivered to the disaster area.  The longer it takes to identify the 
required spare parts to maintain each T/M/S platforms mission capability percentage, the 
worse the MC% degradation will be.  See table 12 for effects of MC% degradation 
B. MODEL RESPONSE SCENARIOS  
We assumed that a 95% customer service level to protect us against variability in 
demand was already in use, and that the ship was already carrying an inventory based on 
each aircraft flying 30 hours a month.  The delta between what the ship’s supply already 
had in inventory, based on these assumptions, and how many more they need to support 
the additional flight hours in an HA/DR mission determined how many parts needed to be 
identified and transported to the response area for each T/M/S to maximize each 
platform’s MC%. 
Recognizing that having these additional parts available would not eliminate the 
mission degradation, we modeled only a 50% reduction in overall mission degradation, 
resulting in only a 5% reduction in mission capability every 5 days Reducing the mission 
degradation to 5% every five days increased our overall aircraft availability, therefore 
increasing the total pounds of supplies and passengers delivered. 
1. Results 
In this model, it only took until day 7 to meet critical survival water demand.   
The model never met overall water demand and delivered only 18% during the 14-day 
mission.  The overall unmet water demand gradually decreased from   26,800,000 pounds 
on day 2 to 18, 18,500,000 pounds on day 14.  Although the model was only able to 
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deliver 59% of the overall food demand, during days 7 through 14, the model delivered 
100% of all food.  The model was able to deliver all 378 people on the first day of 
operations but meeting the displaced personnel demand did not happen. The model only 
delivered 34 displaced personnel.     
2. Model Analysis 
This model demonstrated how increasing the MC% for the aircraft during a 
mission yielded greater overall results.  We were able to deliver 1,468,000 more pounds 
of critical survival water. By reducing the mission capability degradation, it increased the 
available aircraft and allowed us to fulfill a greater percentage of demand.  By getting 
ahead of the degradation curve, it allowed continuous distribution of more aircraft as the 
mission went on.  Table 22 gives the MC% degradation results.   
 



























Critical Survival Water 15,594,165 28,518,000 0.55 46,375,133 42,041,400 1.10 61,969,298 69,560,400 0.83
Water 15,594,165 142,590,000 0.11 46,375,133 205,212,000 0.23 61,969,298 347,802,000 0.18
Food 0 2,444,400 0.00 3,517,920 3,517,920 1.00 3,517,920 5,962,320 0.59
Medical Supplies 0 13,489 0.00 29,583 29,583 1.00 29,583 43,072 0.69
MEDEVAC 378 378 1.00 0 0 0.00 378 378 1.00
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VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
It is evident that the U.S. military will continue its involvement in HA/DR 
missions worldwide; therefore, it is increasingly important to be able to support these 
missions in the best way possible. Government policies provide guidance and support to 
the DoD for HA/DR missions.  Military strategic plans emphasize how important 
supporting disaster relief missions are to the national strategy of the United States. The 
ability to support HA/DR missions as efficiently as possible can help disaster areas 
receive the required aid in the shortest possible time and in the most cost-effective way. 
Looking at the involvement of the U.S. military in previous disasters, it is clear 
that helicopters play a vital role in HA/DR missions. Their ability to get in and out of a 
variety of areas with destroyed roads and infrastructures is a major reason for their 
importance to relief efforts. Their range, capabilities, and ability to adapt to most terrains 
make them the most obvious transportation resources to use in HA/DR missions. 
A. RESEARCH LESSONS LEARNED 
The CSG’s transition from the traditional design of the T/M/S platform 
combination into a new T/M/S platform combination with two helicopter squadrons 
attached to the CVN will increase the delivery capacity of the CSG.  The replacement of 
the CH-46E with the MV-22 on the ARG also enables the readiness group the ability to 
deliver a greater percentage of overall demand.  We showed that this new combination of 
different helicopters can significantly increase the total percentage of demand filled, 
using our model.  The additional SH-60s increased the CSG’s capabilities by 541,650 
pounds, which equates to 7,737 more people receiving their overall water demand.  The 
increased capabilities of the MV-22 ultimate delivered 2,113,500 more pounds of rescue 
supplies than what the ARG could deliver with the CH-46.  This equated to 30,192 more 
people receiving their overall water demand.  This increase in capabilities delivered 
critical rescue supplies at a faster rate. 
Because each HA/DR mission is unique, it is important to quickly analyze what 
resources will be needed to send the best mix to support the mission.  The most beneficial 
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resources are those that can arrive on scene the quickest and start delivering critical 
rescue supplies.  As additional ships with various aircraft arrive on scene, the mission 
leaders can redistribute the aircraft based on a priority list and based on the T/M/S 
platform that they believe will best fill each required demand.   
Based on the priority list we developed, we have identified a recommended 
hierarchy of aircraft to use when fulfilling passenger and poundage demands.  Assuming 
all future response will have a combination of T/M/S platforms comparable to Response 
B; leadership should assign the CH-53E, MH-53E, MV-22, and SH-60 when delivering 
rescue supplies and passengers based on the platform that has the greatest capacity for 
that particular priority. 
Using our cost-efficiency hierarchy, the assignment of aircraft goes first to the 
category of demand they are most efficient at based on their cost per flight hour.  Our 
research shows that when delivering water, food, and medical supplies, leadership should 
assign them in this order: MV-22, MH-53E, SH-60, and then the CH-53E.  When 
delivering MEDEVAC and displaced personnel, leadership should assign them in this 
order: MV-22, MH-53E, CH-53E, and SH-60. 
Since both models use 99% of the aircraft capacity, it is hard to show a cost dollar 
savings with this model.  The true value of the CPH model is demonstrated when 
leadership must choose which T/M/S platforms to leave behind and which 
platforms/ships to move on to the next emergency.  In comparison to the MV-22, not all 
the other aircraft meet the mission requirements as efficiently.  While the SH-60 offers 
more aircrafts, it costs .06 cents more per pound and $125 more per passenger than the 
MV-22 to operate.  The MH-53E costs .03 cents more per pound and $29 more per 
passenger.  The CH-53E costs .17 cents more per pound and $48 more per passenger.  
Because the MV-22 is the most cost-efficient helicopter platform in the mission, it allows 




From our CSG versus ARG model, the final percentage of demand fulfilled 
between the two models shows that the ARG delivers a greater percentage of overall 
demand at a cheaper price.  Based on this information, we can now assume that the ARG 
is more cost effective and operationally effective than the CSG for HA/DR missions 
similar to the one we modeled.  While the CSG provides a quicker response, assuming 
they both start from the same distance, it is clear that the capabilities that the ARG 
provides will fulfill a greater percentage of overall demand once it arrives on scene.   
Understanding that each mission is unique and carefully analyzing the operational 
environment of the disaster area are essential to the success of the mission.  After making 
the decision that the MV-22 can land and take off safely in the area, the DOD should use 
as many of the MV-22 aircraft as they can spare to deploy to the disaster area.  For 
example, removing the CH-53E from the sea-basing ARG could allow enough space to 
embark four additional MV-22 aircraft.  A second option to consider is sending a second 
ARG to the HA/DR mission and removing the CSG from the disaster area as soon as 
possible.  The main reason for having the CSG in an area is the political importance and 
medical capabilities of the aircraft carrier.  Keeping the CSG on scene can prove to cost 
more and waste the capabilities the other non-utilized T/M/S platforms attached to the 
CAG.  A second ARG would supply enough medical capacity to supply the medical 
teams in the LZs at a faster rate for a cheaper price until the medical ships show up.  A 
third option is to send more MH-53E to take the place of the CH-53E on the ARG.  
(Since the MH-53E provides the second greatest value, it is a better option than both the 
CH-53E and SH-60s.) 
As the American population continues to grow into a more fiscally conservative 
nation, it is forcing the DOD to find cheaper and more efficient ways to conduct its 
missions.  Our model shows that assigning aircraft according to their cost efficiency, and 
then following the given priority system, allows each platform to maximize its 
capabilities and deliver a greater percentage of overall demand.  Cost savings is the 
second advantage because when the total number of needed aircraft drops, it allows those 
in charge to use the most cost-effective platforms first to carry out the mission. 
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C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Due to time and information limitations, we were not able to investigate all 
aspects of interest we initially identified.  Other possible models or points of 
consideration would be to compare the values of this model under a different disaster 
scenario in which the landing zone clearance plays a role.  By incorporating landing 
limitations, it should increase the value of the SH-60 when compared to other T/M/S 
platforms.   
There is also need for further analysis on the cost of maintenance in support of 
these missions.  Including unit cost and figuring out the BCM percentage of those 
expected failures will give a clearer total dollar for each squadron in support of the 
mission. Our theory is that by identifying which items fail the most and using the Beyond 
Capable Maintenance (BCM) percentage, we could figure the BCM cost for each of the 
top 10 items.  For those fixable items at the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA), 
there is usually a trend as to what needs repair.  Using AFAST data to find the cost to fix 
the non-BCM items and multiplying it by the predicted number of failures would provide 
the DoD with better maintenance cost information for supporting a HA/DR mission.   
The table for the expected HA/DR missions failures for each T/M/S platform is 
located in the appendix.  This table is incomplete and requires additional SH-60 
information.  From our research, the CH-53E ranks in the lower tier of our cost efficiency 
hierarchy, however it ranks first in the lowest amount of expected maintenance failures.  
The MTBF for this platform’s top ten maintenance failures is significantly lower than the 
other T/M/S platforms.  This leads to less maintenance failures and an overall lower 
maintenance costs during the mission.     
We also recommend using possible modeling programs such as linear 
programming and Crystal Ball.  Using linear programming could provide an optimal 
solution to meet the given priorities for the number of aircraft to assign to each route to 
meet the daily demands.  Using Crystal Ball to measure the variability in the delivery 
system will give a more realistic percentage of overall demand fulfilled over each day of 
the response.  And setting the variability parameters on mission capable percentages and 
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overall efficiency in loading and unloading each T/M/S platform will give us a better 
















Table 23.   H-60 Top 10 Maintenance Failures 
 
 
Table 24.   CH-46 Top 10 Maintenance Failures 
 
Table 25.   CH-53 Top 10 Maintenance Failures 
TEC Nomenclature BCM Price 
AHZN DAMPENER,VIB $19,856.00 
YPAA RADIO SET $9,076.00 
AHZN COMPUTER,DIG $500,475.00 
AHZN STARTER,ENGI $12,843.00 
AHZN RECEIVER,TRA $49,926.00 
AHZN PUMP,HYDRAULIC $23,790.00 
AHZN CONTAINER,FI $3,525.00 
AHZN ACCUMULATOR, $10,416.00 
YPAA RADIO SET $11,597.00 
AHZN PROCESSOR,RA $272,882.00 










Needed Difference Unit Cost BCM Cost
AHRH AIMS,ACQUISITION UN $3,694 $60,862 0.00233 5.66 7.93 10 13 3 $11,082.00 $482,629.23
AHRH TRANSMISSION,MECHAN $235,604 $1,146,690 0.00131 3.18 4.45 6 8 2 $471,208.00 $5,097,336.81
AHRH BLADE ASSY,COMPOSIT $13,470 $251,539 0.00471 11.45 16.03 17 23 6 $80,820.00 $4,031,996.93
AHRH BLADE ASSY,COMPOSIT $16,375 $304,656 0.00472 11.46 16.05 17 23 6 $98,250.00 $4,889,164.32
AHRH HEAD,ROTARY WING $326,315 $382,476 0.00232 5.64 7.89 10 13 3 $978,945.00 $3,018,585.73
AHRH FLIGHT CONTROL GROU $6,428 $90,923 0.00282 6.86 9.61 11 15 4 $25,712.00 $873,432.27
AHRH CYLINDER ASSEMBLY,A $8,709 $10,747 0.00316 7.67 10.74 12 16 4 $34,836.00 $115,384.48
AHRH HEAD,ROTARY WING $314,900 $371,665 0.00179 4.36 6.10 8 10 2 $629,800.00 $2,268,203.30
AHRH CYLINDER ASSEMBLY,A $5,364 $10,236 0.00423 10.28 14.39 16 21 5 $26,820.00 $147,302.10
AHRH ENGINE CONTROL ASSY $6,940 $46,401 0.00107 2.60 3.64 5 7 2 $13,880.00 $168,682.47
Total $2,371,353.00 $21,092,717.65










Needed Difference Unit Cost BCM Cost
AHXC MAIN ROTOR DAMPER $20,899.00 $15,794.00 0.01292 6.20 8.68 11 14 3 $47,382.00 $181,495.58
AHXC TAIL ROTOR PITCH SHAFT SUPPORT $15,868.00 $12,694.00 0.00135 0.65 0.91 2 3 1 $14,379.58 $14,379.58
AHXC TAIL ROTOR GEARBOX $102,416.00 $73,302.00 0.00112 0.54 0.76 2 2 0 $77,341.13 $77,341.13
AHXC TAIL ROTOR BLADE $344,324.00 $28,839.00 0.00551 2.64 3.70 6 7 1 $1,274,107.53 $1,274,107.53
AHXC MAIN ROTOR SWASHPLATE $264,770.00 $105,244.00 0.00202 0.97 1.36 3 3 0 $359,901.77 $359,901.77
AHXC MAIN GEAR BOX $1,168,954.00 $997,311.00 0.00067 0.32 0.45 1 2 1 $529,652.93 $529,652.93
AHXC PRIMARY SERVO $109,544.00 $40,408.00 0.00461 2.21 3.10 5 6 1 $339,168.23 $339,168.23
AHXC TAIL ROTOR SERVO $23,861.00 $19,089.00 0.00135 0.65 0.91 2 3 1 $21,622.83 $21,622.83
AHXC BLADE, ROTARY WING $176,606.00 $117,604.00 0.00966 4.64 6.49 8 11 3 $1,146,955.62 $1,146,955.62





Table 26.   MH-53 Top 10 Maintenance Failures 
 
 
Table 27.   MV-22 Top 10 Maintenance Failures 










Needed Difference Unit Cost BCM Cost
AHXJ MAIN GEARBOX $3,512,229 $1,198,876 0.00040 0.77 2.32 2 3 1 $1,198,876.00 $8,148,016.69
AHXJ ENGINE AIR PARTICLE SEP (EAPS) $82,056 $70,008 0.00430 8.25 24.75 13 17 4 $280,032.00 $2,030,524.11
AHXJ PENDANT ASSY AFT CABIN AMCM WINCH $10,178 $10,178 0.00282 5.41 16.24 9 12 3 $30,532.77 $165,276.87
AHXJ MAIN FUEL CONTROL (-419) $127,890 $24,356 0.00295 5.67 17.01 10 12 2 $48,712.00 $2,175,740.52
AHXJ MAIN ROTOR TANDEM SERVO $169,468 $33,342 0.00148 2.84 8.51 6 7 1 $33,342.00 $1,441,545.05
AHXJ APP GAS TURBINE POWER PLANT $106,414 $58,660 0.00094 1.80 5.41 4 5 1 $58,660.00 $576,029.39
AHXJ MAIN ROTOR BLADE (composite) $307,759 $93,768 0.00564 10.83 32.48 16 22 6 $562,608.00 $9,995,577.33
AHXJ ALL NACELL 0.00537 10.31 30.93 16 21 5 $0.00 $0.00
AHXJ AFCS COMPUTER $207,203 $9,073 0.00456 8.76 26.29 14 18 4 $36,292.00 $5,447,820.46
AHXJ AMCM HYDRAULIC PUMP $54,444 $12,482 0.00255 4.90 14.69 9 11 2 $24,964.00 $799,929.03
Total $2,274,018.77 $30,780,459.44










Needed Difference BCM Cost
LH/RH SWASH PLATE ACTUATOR $93,322 0.00272 6.92 9.69 11 15 4 $904,231.69
RH ENGINE ASSY $311,303 0.00704 17.89 25.04 25 34 9 $7,795,728.65
NO 3&4 VARIABLE FREQ GENERATOR $35,351 0.00893 22.68 31.75 31 41 10 $1,122,394.25
LH PROP ROTOR BLADE ASSY $77,679 0.00251 6.37 8.91 11 14 3 $692,297.05
LH/RH CENTRAL DEICE DISTRIB $17,101 0.00395 10.04 14.06 15 20 5 $240,360.30
1&2 CONSTANT FREQ GENERATOR $59,348 0.00532 13.51 18.91 20 26 6 $1,122,561.11
RH PROP ROTOR BLADE ASSY $79,208 0.00215 5.45 7.63 9 12 3 $604,428.43
LH/RH SWASH PLATE DRIVE TUBE $20,330 0.00196 4.98 6.97 9 11 2 $141,751.92
LH PROPROTOR GEARBOX ASSY $649,418 0.00415 10.54 14.76 16 21 5 $9,582,283.85
NACELLE PANEL $63,161 0.00244 6.20 8.67 11 14 3 $547,806.14
Total $22,753,843.39
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